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In this paper motives for the use of equity wárrants will be
discussed. An equity warrant, from now on to be referred to
as a warrant, is the right issued by a company2 to buy a
certain number of new shares in this company against5
conditions determined at the issuance date (amongst other
things these conditions include the exercise period and the
exercise price)3. Our analysis relies heavily on the
existence of market imperfections, such as accounting and
fiscal aspects. In order not to complicate the analysis too
much, we restrict our discussion to motives for warrants
issued by Dutch companies in the Dutch capital market.
Warrants originate in different ways. They may be the result
of a"pure" finance transaction, e.g. the issue of bonds or
stock in combination with warrants. It is also possible that
warrants are used as e.g. a form of employee compensation or
dividend payment. Duffhues (1990) presents scheme 1 in which
possible warrant originations are summarized.
Scheme 1: warrant originations:
a) an issue in combination with bonds;
b) an issue in combination with common or preferred stock;
c) as a separate issue for cash;
d) as a(partial) payment for a merger or take-over;
e) as a reward for investment banker's services;
f) in a reorganization;
g) as a dividend payment;
h) in an anti-takeover amendment;
i) as a form of employee compensation;
From January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1990 36 Dutch companies
made 42 issues in which warrants were involved4. A complete
list with the names of the companies and the years the
warrants were issued is included in appendix A. Because 6
companies issued 2 different warrants5 at the same time
(generally referred to as warrants A and B), in total 48
warrants were issued. Three of these warrants have been
listed in US dollars, 1 warrant has been listed in Canadian
dollars and the other 44 warrants have been listed in Dutch
guilders. 44 Warrants have been listed on the Official Market
("Officiële Markt"), three warrants have been listed on the
Parallel Market6 ("Parallelmarkt") and 1 warrant (Compudata)
has first been listed on the Parallel Market and later on
the Official Market (under the name "Tulip Computers"). In6
table 1 these 48 warrants are classified according to scheme
l.
Table 1: Warrant issues in
companies from 1976 to 1990.
the Netherlands, made by Dutch
Number of
issues
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From table 1 we can conclude that the issue of warrants in
combination with bonds was the most common use of warrants in
our research-period. These issues made up 50~ of the number
of issues and even 56~ of the total number of different
warrants issued. The remaining 21 warrant-issues consisted of
l0 issues of warrants in combination with common or preferred
stock, 6 warrants issued for cash and 5 warrants issued for
miscellaneous reasons.
In finance literature motives for the use of warrant-bond
packages are generally included in discussions about motives
for the use of convertible bonds. That is why our discussion
starts in section 2 with a review of motíves for the use of
convertible bonds, which can also be applied for warrant-bond
packages. In section 3 the choice between convertible bonds
and warrant-bond packages on one side and packages
consisting of put-warrants and common stock, generally
referred to as puttable common stock, on the other side will
be discussed. In section 4 differences between convertible
bonds and warrant-bond packages will be discussed, followedby the impact these differences may have on the company's
choice between an issue of convertible bonds and an issue of
warrant-bond packages. In section 5 we will pay attention to
motives for the use of warrant-bond packages, followed by
section 6 where we will review motives for the several
possibilities to use separate issues of warrants. In section
7 the use of warrants in an anti-takeover amendment will be
discussed and in section 8 the benefits for the use of
warrants as a form of employee compensation will be reviewed.
The paper finishes with a summary and some conclusions.
2. Motives for the use of convertible bonds and warrant-bond
packages.
2.1. Introduction.
In the introduction we have already mentioned the fact that
in finance literature motives for the use of warrant-bond
packages are generally included in discussions about motives
for the use of convertible bonds. Therefore we will discuss
motives for the use of convertible bonds, that can also be
applied to warrant-bond packages, in this section. The choice
between convertible bonds and warrant-bond packages will be
discussed in the next section.
In this paper we will use the most common definition of a
convertible bond: a convertible bond is the combination of a
bond and a non-detachable warrant; this warrant may only be
exercised by redeeming the accompanying bond8. Furthermore we
assume in this paper that conversion is only possible at the
redemption date9.
Because in this section only motives for the use of
convertible bonds are discussed that can also be applied to
warrant-bond packages, the term convertible bond refers in
this section also to warrant-bond packages. This is also the
case for the term "warrant", this term refers to both
warrants and conversion rights.
In this paper we will distinguish "traditional motives"8
(section 2.2) and "modern motives" ( sections 2.3 and 2.4)




Traditional motives for the use of convertible bonds are10:
1) they allow companies to sell stock at a premium over the
current stock price;
2) they are a cheap source of capital because they carry
coupon rates below the market rates of interest on
straight debt;
These motives reached much support in surveys made by Brigham
(1966), Hoffineister (1977) and Melicher and Hoffineister
(1977).
The survey held by Brigham (1966) indicated that 68~ of the
financial officers used convertible debt because they
believed that their stock would rise over time and that
convertibles would provide a way of selling common stock at a
price above the existing market price. Another 27~ said that
their company wanted straight debt but found conditions to be
such that a straight bond issue could not be sold at a
reasonable rate of interest.
The most important conclusions that could be drawn from the
questionnaire held by Hoffineister (1977) is that the desire
to sell common stock on a delayed basis was selected as most
important motive by 34g of the firms surveyed, and was named
as a motivational factor by 70~ (that is first, second or
third choice) and that the desire to reduce the interest cost
of a debt issue was given as most important motive by 30~ of
the firms, and was involved in the motivation of 58~.
The survey held by Melicher and Hoffineister (1977) indicated
that the most important reason for the issue of convertible
debt was the reduction of interest costs of the debt-issue.
Somewhat less important was the fact that common stock could9
be sold at a price above the prevailing market price.
In the next sub-sections we will see that none of the
traditional motives makes much sense.
2 2 2 "A deferred sale of stock at an attractive nrice".
There are two reasons why an issue of convertible bonds can
not be considered as a deferred sale of stock at an
attractive price.
In the first place, a conversion price of e.g. f 75, which
must be paid after 5 years in order to acquire common stock
may not be compared with the existing market price of e.g. f
50. This future price of f 75 must be compared with the then
prevailing price of the common stock. It is possible that the
stock price will be f 125 over 5 years. In that case the
company certainly does not sell common stock at an
attractive price. In fact the company suffers a substantial
opportunity lossil.
The second objection against this motive is that it is not
sure whether stock will be issued in the future. An issue of
stock will only take place if the conversion rights will be
exercised. This will only occur if the future stock price
exceeds the exercise price12. Therefore it can be concluded
that an issue of convertible bonds can not be qualified as a
deferred sale of stock at an attractive price.
2 2 3 "A cheap form of canital".
The fact that convertible bonds carry low coupon interest
rates does not mean that they are a cheap form of capital.
The price that is paid for a convertible bond can be divided
in two parts: a part that is paid for the straight debt-value
and a part that is paid for the conversion rights. Because
the conversion rights can in fact be considered as "implicit
warrants", we will refer to the conversion rights as
"warrants" in the remainder of this sub-section.
Copeland and Weston (1988, page 476) argue that using the10
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Black and Scholes
(1973) model (B~S-model) the cost of a convertible bond issue
can be calculated as a weighted average of the cost of
straight debt and the cost of the warrantl3:
kc~ - kb ,~ [B B W~ t k,,l ~~B W W~
where:
kc~ - cost of a convertible bond-issue;
kb - cost of a similar straight debt-issue;
B - the bond-value of the convertible bond-issue;
kw - cost of a warrant;
W - warrant-value of the convertible bond-issue.
(1)
By means of illustration we calculate the cost of two
convertible bond-issues. A convertible bond-issue made by a
medium risk company (company M) and a convertible bond-issue
made by a high risk company (company H). The characteristics
of both issues are summarized in table 214.
Both companies are assumed to be non-dividend paying.
The bond values of the convertible bond-issues can be
calculated using equation (2):
n
B- E I f F
t-1 (1 - f kb~ (1 t kb) n
(2)
where:
B - the convertible bond's value as a straight debt
instrument;
I - dollars of interest paid each year;
F - bond's redemption value at maturity;
kb - cost of a similar straight debt issue;
n - maturity of the bond.
After substituting the variables 1 to 4 from table 2, a bond
value of f 897.04 results for company M. The bond value for
company H is somewhat lower, i.e. f 844.46.
The values of the warrant-parts of the convertible bond-
issues can be estimated using the B~S-modell5:
C - SN(dl) - Xe-rf(T-t)N(d2) (3)11
where:
C - the price of a warrant;
S - the price of the underlying stock;
X - the exercise price;
T-t - the time to maturity;
rf - the risk-free interest rate;
N(.) - cumulative standard normal distribution;
dl - ln(SfX)t(rftQ~ ~2) (T-t)
aJ(T-t)
d2 - dl - oJ(T-t);
a - the standard deviation of the firm's equity rate of
return.
Table 2: Characteristics of the convertible bond-issues made
by Company M and Company H.
Input-factor Sym- Risk-class
bol Medium High
Companv M Company H
Bonds
1 Coupon interest (year) i llá 11.25~
2 Face value16 F f 1000 f 1000
3 Cost of a similar (non-con-
vertible) debt-issue kb 14~ 16~
4 Maturity of the bond n 5 years 5 years
warrants
5 Stock price S f 50 f 50
6 Exercise price X f 75 f 75
7 Maturity of the warrant T-t 5 years 5 years
8 Risk-free interest rate rf 10~ l0~
9 Standard deviation of the
firm's equity rate of return a 0.1205 0.2183
10 Conversion ratio17 13.33318 13.333
11 Beta of the company's stock Qs 1.2 2.4
If the variables 5 to 9 from table 2 are substituted in
equation (3) a warrant price (C) of f 7.72 results for
company M and a warrant price (C) of f 11.67 results for12
company H. The value of the warrant-part (W) of the
convertible bond issue results if the conversion ratio (in
both cases 13.333) is multiplied by the warrant-price (C).
The warrant values (W) of company M and company H are
respectively f 102.96 and f 155.54.
The last parameter from equation (1) that must be estimated
is the cost of a warrant. According to Copeland and Weston
(1988, page 476) this variable can be determined using the
Security Market Line (SML) from the CAPM:
kw - rf f [E(rm) - rf]Qw (4)
where:
E(rm) - the expected return of the market portfolio;
(3w - the systematic risk of the warrant;
E(rm)-rf - the market price of risk per unit beta.
We assume a market price of risk (E(rm)-rf) of 6~. Using the
CAPM and the B~S-model Copeland and Weston (1988, page 476)
derive an equation for the calculation of ~w:
Qw - ~c - ~ ~s (5)
where:
Qc - the beta of a call-option written on the same firm,
without warrants;
r - the option's elasticity - (óC~óS)(S~C);
óC~óS - the factor N(dl) from the B~S-model;
(3s - the systematic risk of a share of common stock19.
Using equations (2) to (5) it is possible to determine the
input factors which are necessary to calculate the cost of
the convertible bond loan. If these factors are substituted
in equation (1) the costs of the convertible bond loans
result, whích are presented in table 3.
From table 3 we can conclude that the cost of the warrants is
well above the cost of straight debt. This causes the cost of
the convertible bonds to be higher than the cost of straight
debt. In table 3 it can be seen that the cost of the
warrants, 42.09~ and 51.35~ respectively, is also above the
cost of equity, 17.20~ and 24.40~ respectively. Jarrow and
Rudd (1983, pages 120-121), prove that in case Qw is13
calculated using the B~S-model (as is done in this paper) it
is always above the beta of the underlying common stock. This
implies that the cost of warrants is above the cost of common
stock20.
Table 3: the costs of the convertible bond loans issued bv
the medium and hiah risk company.
Input-factor Sym- Risk-class
bol Medium High
Company M Company H
Straight debt value B f 897.04 f 844.46
Warrant value W f 102.96 f 155.54
Convertible bond value CV f 1,000 f 1,000
Cost of straight debt kb 14~ 16~
Cost of warrants kw 42.09~ 51.35~
Cost of convertible bonds kcv 16.89g 21.50~
Cost of equity ks 17.20~ 24.40~
Conclusion of this sub-section is that convertible bonds are
not a cheap form of capital, they are more like an expensive
form of capital, due to the high cost of the warrant-
component.
2.3. FinancinQ with convertible bonds and warrant-bond
packactes in perfect, efficient and complete capital markets.
In the preceding section we reached the conclusion that the
cost of warrants is higher than the cost of bonds and the
cost of equity. This means that warrants are relatively
"expensive" forms of capital. However, we want to emphasize
that an "expensive" forn of capital is not necessarily a form
of capital that a firm should avoid.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) prove that in case capital
markets are perfect, efficient and complete, the investment-
and financing decisions are irrelevant for the market value14
of the firm. In such a world, where no taxes, no bankruptcy
costs and no transaction costs exist, where everyone
costlessly possesses the same information and where all
required finance instruments are available, the financing
decision does not add extra market value to the market value
created by the projects themselves. In a world as described
above the Modigliani and Miller (1958, page 268) theorem is
valid:
"The average cost of capital to any firm is completely
independent of its capital structure and is equal to the
capitalization rate of a pure equity stream of its class".
This is also true if a firm makes an issue of warrants for
cash, a so-called issue of "naked warrants". We have already
seen that a firm offers holders of warrants a high rate of
return on their investment. This high rate of return can be
explained from the fact that a warrant is more risky21 for
investors than other finance instruments, such as bonds or
common stock, are. Therefore this higher return that
translates into a higher cost, is only based on the fact that
investors are compensated for the higher risk. Because
warrant holders bear part of the risk that was first borne by
holders of common stock, the required return on equity and
therefore the cost of equity will diminish. The cost of
capital of the firm remains constant. As Duffhues (1990)
argues, trading of warrant-risk by the issuer, only leads to
a redistribution of existing market risk between the
different types of investors. The issue of warrants in
perfect, efficient and complete capital markets only leads to
a non-value creating trade-off between risk and return. In
such a world the fact that warrants are an "expensive" form
of capital is neither an advantage nor a disadvantage of this
finance instrument22.
In reality capital markets are not perfect, efficient and
complete23. In practice market imperfections, market
inefficiencies and market incompleteness do exist. In the
next section we will discuss a number of these market
imperfections, -inefficiencies and -incompleteness that may15
lead firms to issue convertible bonds (and of course
warrant-bond packages).
2.4. The existence of market imperfections, market
inefficiencies and market incompleteness.
2.4.1. Introduction.
In this section we will discuss market imperfections, market
inefficiencies and market incompleteness that may lead a
company to issue convertible bonds. First we will define the
terms "market perfection", "market efficiency" and "market
completeness".
i) Definitions of market perfection, market efficiency and
market completeness.
A large body of literature has appeared on the subjects of
market perfection, market efficiency and market completeness.
After studying this literature Tempelaar and Overmeer (1983,
1986 and 1987) have come to the following classification of
these terms.
According to Tempelaar and Overmeer (1987) market perfection
is based on the characteristics of "competitivity" and
"frictionless markets"24. These characteristics can be
explained as follows:
1) "competitivity" results in "price taking behaviour", in
other words, buyers and sellers, or issuers, of securities
take the prices of securities as given; that is, they do,
and can justifiably act as if their activities in the
market had no detectable effect on the ruling prices;
2) "frictionless markets", this means:
a) all traders have equal and costless access to information
about the ruling prices and all other relevant properties
of the securities traded;
b) there are no brokerage fees, transfer taxes, or other
transaction costs incurred when securities are bought,16
sold, or issued;
c) taxes are neutral, that is taxation does not discriminate
between income in the form of capital gains and dividends
or interest, thus taxation on itself may exist, but it
may not discriminate.
Market efficiencv is defined by Tempelaar and Overmeer (1987)
in accordance with Fama (1970, page 383):
"A market in which prices always "fully reflect" available
information is called efficient."25.
Tempelaar and Overmeer (1987) define complete markets as
markets where by combining all available securities in
security-portfolio's every possible future distribution can
be exchanged for a present-day (certain) amount. Or to follow
the definition of Van Horne (1985, page 621):
"A complete market exists when every contingency in the world
corresponds to a distinct marketable security".
Summarizing: market perfection includes "competitivity" and
"frictionless markets", market efficiency refers to the
quality resulted from market prices and market completeness
is related to the potential on the securities market.
ii) Market imperfections, -inefficiencies and -incompleteness
applied to convertible bonds.
Based on finance literature written about on this subject,
and our own ideas, we come to the following motives for the
use of convertible bonds based on market imnerfections:
- managers often underestimate the cost of equity, and
therefore the cost of warrants;
- convertible bonds are relatively26 insensitive to the risk
of the issuing company, this leads to a reduction in (a)
information costs and (b) agency costs;
- convertible bonds are a means to resolve liquidity
problems;
- an issue of convertible bonds may lead to a reduction in
flotation costs.
Market imperfections also include institutional factors of17
which the most important are:
- accounting aspects;
- fiscal aspects.
Existing market inefficiencies may be important for the
companies choice to issue convertible bonds, this may be the
case if:
- the underlying stock is undervalued;
- the underlying stock is overvalued.
Finally convertible bonds can also serve a role in making the
market more complete.
Each of these motives will be discussed in a separate sub-
section.
2.4.2. An underestimation of the true costs of convertible
bonds.
A possible motive for the issue of convertible bonds is that
in practice the cost of equity receives little or no
attention in the finance decision. In practice it is often
stated that the cost of equity consists of the dividend
yield. Consequence is that the cost of warrants is also
misunderstood. This also proved to be the case in two papers
presented on a conference about equíty warrants and
convertibles (London, 4th and 5th April, 1989).
At this conference Jabre (1989) stated:
"Generally a market that increases a lot will see a large
number of new issues in convertible and bonds with warrants
because companies will get a cheaper source of financing than
with straight bonds."
Obviously Jabre (1989) fails to understand the fact that
warrants have any cost at all, in fact he considers warrants
as a "free lunch".
Somewhat more sophisticated, but still wrong, was a
statement made by A Brassard (1989) at the same conference:
"The cost of equity linked financing will fall between the
costs of equity and debt being determined by the number of
years of "cheap" debt"27.18
In section 2.2.3 we have already seen that the cost of a
convertible falls between the cost of debt and the cost of
warrants, not between the cost of debt and the cost of
equity.
Such statements lead us to conclude that in practice the cost
of convertible bonds is not clearly understood. In section
2.2.3 we have seen that the costs of these financing
resources consist of the cost of debt weighed by the debt-
component and the cost of warrants weighed by the warrant-
component.
One factor responsible for financial innovation that is
mentioned by Finnerty (1988) is academic work that resulted
in advances of financial theories or better understanding of
the risk-return characteristics of existing classes of
securities28. Based on the belief in practice that warrants
are "cheap capital" we argue that better understanding of the
risk-return characteristics of warrants might result in less
issues of convertible bonds. In other words, our belief is
that one market imperfection responsible for the use of
convertible bonds and warrant-bond packages is the fact that
its true cost is often misunderstood.
2 4 3 The relative insensitivity to the risk of the issuin4
company.
The motive for the use of convertible bonds (and of course
warrant-bond packages) that has received most support in
international finance literature is the relative
insensitivity of the package consisting of bonds and warrants
to the risk of the issuing company29. This motive can be
explained as follows.
In section 2.2.3 we have already seen that in case of
straight debt, higher risk associated with a company's
operations results in higher interest costs. We have also
seen that companies with higher operating and financial risk
tend to have more volatile stock prices, which has a
profitable effect on the value of the warrant. This is due to19
the fact that the holder of a warrant profits from an
increase in the stock price, but is protected against a
decline below the exercise price. The fact that the value of
ordinary bonds is negatively influenced by an increase of
risk, while the value of the warrant is positively influenced
by an increase of risk, causes convertible bonds to be
relative insensitive to the risk of the issuing company.
Based on this fact, Brennan and Schwartz (1986) mention the
following three advantages of convertible bonds:
i) the inclusion of warrants in a debt-package offers a
kind of "financing synergy" for high risk companies;
ii) the insensitivity to risk makes it easier for the bond
issuer and the bond purchaser to come to terms;
iii) bondholders are protected against the adverse
consequences of management policies which would increase
the risk of the company.
Each of these advantages will be discussed in a separate sub-
division.
i) "A financing synergy".
According to Brennan and Schwartz (1986) the fact that an
increase of risk has a profitable impact on the value of a
warrant, means in practice that two companies at different
points along the risk spectrum, facing very different costs
of straight debt, could issue convertibles with nearly
identical maturities, conversion rights and coupon rates.
Their illustration of such a case is presented in table 4.
Table 4: Coupon rates recruired on new issues of straiaht and
convertible debt.
Company Risk Medium High
Convertible debt 11~ 11.25~
Straight debt 14~ 16~
Brennan and Schwartz (1986) argue that while the terms of the
convertible debt sold by the medium and high risk companies
are almost identical, the proportions of the convertible's20
value which are accounted for by the straight debt element
(B) and the warrant element (W) are quite different. For the
higher risk company less of the convertible's value is
accounted for by the straight debt component, and
correspondingly more by the conversion or warrant element. In
a note Brennan and Schwartz (1986) notice that the cost of
the convertible bond is higher for Company H than for
Company M because of the larger warrant-component.
Brennan and Schwartz (1986, page 166) express the advantage
of convertible debt for high risk firms as follows:
"We are not suggesting, in this example, that convertibles
offer higher-risk companies a"free lunch." We are arguing,
however, that the inclusion of warrants in a debt package
provides a kind of financing "synergy" which allows companies
with high and uncertain risk to raise capital on more
advantageous terms."
With regard to this argumentation we emphasize that the
relevant interest costs are not the coupon-rates, but the
required returns on the bonds. In fact Company H sells bonds
with a coupon rate of 11',~, at an issue price of f 844.46.
This means that debt is sold at a required return (kb) of
16~. In addition warrants are sold for f 155.54. In our
opinion companies with hiQh risk do not raise debt at more
advantageous terms, they raise debt at its appropriate cost.
Therefore we conclude that there is no incentive per se for
high risk companies to issue convertible bonds.
ii) "Easier to come to terms".
Brennan and Schwartz (1986, page 166) continue their
argumentation as follows. They present the following
argument:
"Consider the further case of a company whose managers
believe it to be one of inedium risk, but which is perceived
by the market to be high risk. Facing a 16 percent coupon
rate, when companies of what it deems comparable risk are
paying only 14 percent, the management of such a company may21
find straight debt prohibitively expensive. Although
convertible debt will also appear expensive, because the
company must pay llzg percent coupon instead of the 11
percent it considers reasonable, the effect of the divergence
in risk assessment between management and the market is much
less for the convertible than for the straight debt".
The proposition of Brennan and Schwartz (1986) comes down to
the argument that the risk perceived by the bondholders is
higher than the actual risk. Therefore they pay less for
straight bonds of the firm than they would have if they knew
the actual risk. On the other hand they are willing to pay
more for the conversion right, because the value of the
conversion right is higher if the risk is higher. Therefore
management of a firm with uncertain risk will have a
preference for convertible debt, because the value of the
package of bond and conversion right is relatively
insensitive to the risk of the issuing company. This argument
is based on "asymmetric information" between the company and
the market30. Convertible bonds serve in fact to reduce
information costs. Based on the arguments presented above, we
argue that there is an incentive for companies with uncertain
risk to issue convertible bonds.
iii) "A protection against the adverse consequences of
management policies".
The third advantage of convertible bonds mentioned by Brennan
and Schwartz (1986) is that convertible bonds protect the
bondholder against adverse consequences of management
policies.
This argument was already put forward in 1976 by Jensen and
Meckling. They present a framework in which the owner-manager
of a firm, who retains complete control over the firm,
attracts outside capital in the form of outside equity and~or
risky debt. Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrate that
financing through the issuance of common stock or debt to
outsiders engenders costs of which we mention:22
- costs following from the manager's propensity to consume
non-pecuniary benefits or perquisites ( perks) by employing
certain resources in excess of their optimal usage3l~
- costs following from the manager's propensity to engage in
high risk investment projects so as to transfer wealth from
bondholders to stockholders.
We will limit our analysis to the last mentioned problem,
which is generally referred to as the "risk incentive
problem"32.
Jensen and Meckling (1976, page 335-337) explain the "risk
incentive problem" as follows. Consider two projects, which
have the same expected total payoff and the same systematic
risk, but different variances. The variance of project LOWVAR
is smaller than the variance of project HIGHVAR. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) assume that the asset prices are determined
according to the CAPM. Both projects have the same market
value, based on the assumptions of equal total payoff and
equal systematic risk. They argue that if the owner has the
opportunity to first issue debt and then to decide which of
the investments to take he can transfer wealth from the
bondholders to himself as equity holder by promising to take
project LOWVAR, selling bonds and then take project HIGHVAR.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) use the B~S-option pricing model
to explain this wealth transfer. The stockholders in the firm
can be viewed as holding a European call-option on the total
value of the firm with an exercise price equal to the face
value of the debt, exercisable at the maturity of the debt
issue. Because Merton (1973) has shown that as the variance
of the outcome distribution rises, the value of the stock
(i.e. call-option) rises, and since the variance of project
HIGHVAR is larger than the variance of project LOWVAR,
project HIGHVAR has a higher equity value than project
LOWVAR. Because we have seen that the market values of the
projects are the same, project HIGHVAR must then have a lower
bond value than project LOWVAR. If the bondholders cannot
prevent the owner-manager from changing the investment23
program, and if they perceive that the manager has the
opportunity to take project HIGHVAR, they will pay the
manager only the bond-value of project HIGHVAR, realizing
that his maximizing behaviour will lead him to choose project
HIGHVAR. In this case there is no redistribution of wealth
between bondholders and stockholders and no welfare loss.
Jensen and Meckling (1976), however, also describe the
following situation in which a welfare loss is incurred. If
the expected cash flow of project HIGHVAR has a lower
expected value than the expected cash flow of project LOWVAR,
the value of project HIGHVAR will be lower than the value of
project LOWVAR. In this case stockholders may nevertheless
have an incentive to choose project HIGHVAR, because the
wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders may be
greater than the reduction in the value of the firm. Again
the bondholders will perceive the motivation of the equity-
owing manager and his opportunity to take project HIGHVAR.
They will presume he will take project HIGHVAR and hence will
pay no more than the bond value for project HIGHVAR for the
bonds when they are issued. The reduced value of the firm
(the difference between the value of project LOWVAR and
project HIGHVAR) is the agency cost engendered by the
issuance of debt and is borne by the owner manager. This
welfare loss is generally referred to as "residual loss".
Jensen and Meckling (1976) admit that although this reasoning
provides some intuitive understanding of the incentives
facing the equity holders, the option pricing solutions of
Black and Scholes (1973), do not apply when incentive effects
cause the value of the firm to be a function of the debt-
equity ratio as it is in general and in this example. With
regard to the intuitive reasoning based on the Black and
Scholes (1973) model, Green (1984, page 115) notes:
"Such appeals to option pricing results rely on models which
price claims by taking as exogenous the value of the
underlying asset. Yet the same appeals use comparative
statics from these models to determine endogenously the value
of the firm and argue for its dependence on the structure of24
the claims which are issued".
Green (1984) formalizes the intuitive reasoning of Jensen and
Meckling (1976) by explicitly modelling the decision problem
faced by "insiders" who wish to maximize the value of their
residual claim while financing operations with debt. In this
modellinq Green (1984) abstracts from the potential conflicts
of interest between management and equity holders. He
succeeds in proving that if a firm has the choice between a
risky and a less risky investment project, and the firm has
risky debt outstanding, it invests more in the risky project
relative to the less risky project, than it would have done
if the project were all equity financed. Therefore a"risk
incentive problem" indeed exists.
That warrants and conversion rights may serve a role in
reducing the "risk incentive problem" has also been suggested
by Jensen and Meckling (1976, page 354):
"It seems that the incentive effects of warrants would tend
to offset to some extent the incentive effects of the
existence of risky debt because the owner-manager would be
sharing part of the proceeds associated with a shift in the
distribution of returns with the warrant holders"33.
Green (1984, page 125) makes the following comment on this
remark by Jensen and Meckling (1976):
"This conjecture fails to make clear just how this 'sharing'
would reduce initial shareholders' incentives to increase the
risk of the firm. For instance, if insiders were to simply
issue outside equity with the risky debt, they would be
sharing any wealth expropriated from bondholders. Yet, it is
not clear that this would reduce their incentives to engage
in this expropriation. Their claim remains a residual one,
even if there are other residual claims outstanding."
This comment made by Green (1984) means that in fact equity
holders can still increase their wealth (at the expense of
bond holders) by investing in risky projects. Bond holders
only get back part of the wealth expropriation, while they25
have paid for all of it, therefore the "risk incentive
problem" would still exist.
Based on the fact that a warrant is a special equity claim,
in the sense that it is only valuable after a certain stock
price is realized, Green (1984) proves that it is possible to
construct a contract, consisting of a bond and a warrant,
that controls the "risk incentive problem".
In an empirical research Long and Sefcik (1990) compare the
standard deviation of common stock returns for the periods
259 to 20 trading days prior to and 21 to 260 trading days
after the day where a convertible bond-issue (in total 135)
or an issue of warrant-bond packages (in total 64) takes
place. They conclude that in both cases no significant
difference between the pre- and post-issuance mean could be
found. Therefore they conclude that both forms of financinq
tools control the risk shifting problem equally effective.
Haugen and Senbet (1981) argue that the "risk incentive
problem" and the "perquisite consumption problem" can be
resolved simultaneously. Haugen and Senbet (1981) depart from
the original Jensen and Meckling (1976) framework in which
the owner-manager of a firm raises capital by issuing outside
securities. Haugen and Senbet (1981) notice that if the
settlement for external finance includes an external option
for the manager to buy back the entire firm, the manager's
incentive to consume perks will be reduced, because
perquisite consumption reduces the value of his call-option.
However, the "risk incentive problem" will increase if the
manager holds such an external call-option. Haugen and Senbet
(1981) note that this problem can be overcome by including an
external put option in the finance settlement. This external
put option is written by the owner manager to the outside
investors. The put option gives the outsiders the right to
sell the entire firm at a stated price to the owner manager
at the termination of the period. If the manager shifts to
the low value, high variance project (in our Jensen and
Meckling example project HIGHVAR) the value of the put option26
increases. This is due to the fact that both the increase in
variance and the decrease in the value of the firm enhances
its value. Haugen and Senbet (1981) demonstrate that the
terms for both options can be designed so that the manager
will neither have an incentive to consume perks, nor to
shift to risky projects.
Haugen and Senbet (1981) state that their use of a call-
option is analogous to the use of employee stock options in
managerial compensation schedules. They also argue that the
put-option, in combination with the common stock of the firm,
can be thought of as a surrogate for the convertible bond34.
For a more elaborate discussion on this matter we refer to
Haugen and Senbet (1981) and Barnea, Haugen and Senbet
(1985)35.
iv) Conclusion.
The main conclusions from this sub-section are that the
relative insensitivity of convertible bonds to the risk of
the issuing company leads to the following advantages:
i) the argument brought forward by Brennan and Schwartz
(1986) that convertibles can be issued on terms that look
fair to management, even when the market rates the risk of
the issuer higher than does management;
2) the advantage first noticed by Jensen and Meckling (1976)
and later formalised by Green (1984) that bond holders are
protected against the adverse consequences of management
policies which would increase the risk of the issuing
company; finally we notice that according to Haugen and
Senbet (1981), the combination of convertible bonds and
employee stock options can simultaneously resolve the
"risk incentive problem" and the perquisite consumption
problem.
The difference between these advantages can best be expressed
by referring to the first advantage as a way to overcome
"asymmetric information" and thus information costs and the
second advantage as a way to overcome "misleading27
information" and thus agency costs.
2.4.4. A means to resolve lictuidity problems.
An alternative rationale for the use of convertible bonds is
presented by Brealey and Myers (1988, page 534). They present
the following reasoning:
"The relatively low coupon rate on convertible bonds may also
be a convenience for rapidly growing firms facing heavy
capital expenditures. They may be willing to give up the
conversion option to reduce immediate cash requirements for
debt service. Without the conversion option, lenders might
demand extremely high (promised) interest rates to compensate
for the probability of default. This would not only force the
firm to raise still more capital for debt service, but also
increase the risk of financial distress. Paradoxically,
lenders' attempts to protect themselves against default may
actually increase the probability of financial distress by
increasing the burden of debt service on the firm."
The rationale that Brealey and Myers (1988) indicate is that
the required return on a warrant is to be paid at the end of
its maturity, while interest costs (generally) need to be
paid annually36. If a firm has investment projects that
require relative large cash outflows in the beginning and
only pay large cash inflows at the end, it may benefit from
the use of convertible bonds. Convertible bonds overcome the
market imperfection of a liquidity problem. These liquidity
problems are especially relevant for rapidly growing firms.
2.4.5. A reduction in flotation costs.
In case a firm issues convertible bonds, it can save on
flotation costs. This saving occurs, because if a firm raises
debt capital now and equity capital later, flotation costs
will be incurred twice. The convertible bond arrangement
allows the firm to incur flotation costs only once and still
reach the same objective (provided, of course, the price of28
common stock rises to the point where conversion takes
place).
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) present statistics for randomly
selected US companies who made in total 62 issues of common
stock, 147 issues of straight debt and 25 issues of
convertible debt between 1972 and 1982. They conclude that
the average flotation costs, expressed as a percentage of the
total amount offered, are 1.3~ for straight debt, 6.0~ for
common stock and 3.8~ for convertible debt. This means that
an issue of straight debt followed by an issue of common
stock first requires 1.3~ and later 6.0~ of the total amount
offered, while an issue of convertible bonds only requires
3.8~.
2.4.6. AccountinQ benefits.
Firms may prefer the use of convertible bonds and warrant-
bond packages, because of the favourable effect they may have
on the companies financial reporting. Before we pay attention
to the inclusion of warrant-bond packages in the firms
financial report we make some remarks on the reporting of
outstanding warrants.
With regard to the reporting of outstanding warrants, the
Dutch council for annual reporting ("Raad voor de
Jaarverslaggeving") has enacted a guideline. This guideline
includes that in a note on the shareholders' equity, the
following factors should be mentioned:
1) the amount and nominal value of shares on which warrants
are written;
2) the exercise price and the maturity of the outstanding
warrants;
3) possible special conditions under which the warrants are
qranted, as well as other relevant information.
These guidelines are not binding, however companies are
strongly advised to follow them.
In a research on the reporting of the warrants mentioned in29
table 1, Duffhues and Veld (1991) conclude that over 1987,
1988 and 1989 respectively 60g, 50~ and 59~ of the companies
followed the above mentioned guidelines. They find the
following deviations from these guidelines:
a) some companies that have warrants outstanding do not
mention this on any place in their annual report;
b) some companies present information on outstanding warrants
not as a note on shareholders' equity, but on another
place in the annual report;
c) some companies do not present all information required
following these guidelines.
Veld and Duffhues (1990) argue that accounting for warrant-
bond packages in the Netherlands is characterised by a range
of permissible methods, of which the most important are37:
1) the "discount method";
2) the "par method".
ad. 1) the "discount method".
In table 5 the accounting consequences of the "discount
method" are presented for our earlier discussed company H38.
Table 5: The application of the "discount method" for company
H(all amounts are in guilders).
End Bonds Paid-in- Coupon Amorti- Debt
of capital interest zation costs
year discount (4) f (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 161
0 844.46 155.54 0 0 0
1 867.07 155.54 112.50 22.61 135.11
2 893.30 155.54 112.50 26.23 138.73
3 923.73 155.54 112.50 30.43 142.93
4 959.03 155.54 112.50 35.30 147.80
5 1,000 155.54 112.50 40.94 153.44
On the balance sheet it is shown that at the end of year 0,
debt with warrants is recorded as debt to the extent of the30
debt-portion of the package (column 2) and as common equity
(additional paid-in-capital, see column 3) to the extent of
the warrant-portion of the package. As debt costs are
recognized the coupon interest of f 112.50 (- 11~~ of f
1000, see column 4) and the amortization of the original
issue discount (column 5). This amortization equals the
difference between the market rate of interest in year 1(16~
of f 844.46 s f 135.11) and the coupon interest (f 112.50),
and is therefore equal to f 22.61. The amortization is added
to the balance of debt outstanding. Therefore the amount of
debt at the end of year 1 becomes f 844.46 plus f 22.61 is f
867.07 39. As the debt-issue approaches maturity, the book
value of the debt approaches and eventually equals the
principle amount of the debt (at the end of year 5, the debt
portion is equal to f 1,000).
The "discount method" correctly reflects the economic
substance of the transaction. Debt is recorded for its "real"
value. The payment for the warrants is considered as the
first payment for shares to be issued in the future and is
therefore recorded as additional paid-in-capital (see also
Tempelaar (1986)). Debt costs are also recorded for their
real value.
ad. 2) the "par method".
In table 6 the accounting consequences of the "par-method"
are presented for Company H. In this method the package of
debt with warrants is recorded as debt from its issuance
date. As debt costs are only recognized the payment of the
coupon interest costs.From a comparison between tables 5 and
6 we conclude that the "par method" has a more beneficial
impact on financial reporting, because it shows lower debt
costs than the "discount method", which causes the ratio of
"debt costs to total debt" to be lower and therefore the
"return on net worth" to be higher. Disadvantage from this
point of view for the "par method" is that the debt component
on the balance sheet is higher, which causes the "debt-ratio"
to be higher.31
Table 6: The application of the "par method" for comt~anv H
(all amounts are in quildersl.
End Bonds Paid-in- Coupon Amorti- Debt
of capital interest zation costs
year discount (4) f (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 1000 0 0 0 0
1 1000 0 112.50 0 112.50
2 1000 0 112.50 0 112.50
3 1000 0 112.50 0 112.50
4 1000 0 112.50 0 112.50
5 1000 0 112.50 0 112.50
We notice that in case of an issue of convertible bonds, the
use of the "par method" is obliged. As mentioned earlier, the
company has a choice between both alternatives in case of a
warrant-bond loan. In a supplementary study Duffhues and Veld
(1991) investigate the annual reports over 1987, 1988 and
1989. In total 12 companies had warrant-bond packages
outstanding in at least one of these years. Only 4 companies
used the "discount method" (Philips, KLM, Stork and NMB),
while the other 8 companies used the "par method"40.
We conclude this sub-section by noticing that companies can
and actually do benefit from warrant-bond loans to increase
their "paper" "return on net worth". However, it may be
expected that as far as financial markets are informational
efficient, the paper character of this "advantage" is
discovered by market participants. Or as Finnerty (1986, page
81) argues:
"it is doubtful whether such financial reporting benefits per
se can have a significant and lasting impact on the stock
market value of a company".
2.4.7. Fiscal benefits.32
i) Tax aspects for the investor.
In February 1986 the Dutch Parliamentary Undersecretary of
Finance launched a resolution in which income tax aspects of
warrant-bond loans were settled4l. This resolution will
hereafter be referred to as the warrant-resolution. The
general belief is that the warrant-resolution not only
applies to warrant-bond packages, but also to convertible
bonds42. The most important contents of the warrant-
resolution can be summarized as follows43. In case a warrant-
bond loan is to be issued, bearing an interest percentage
that is more than ~~ below the market rate of interest, taxes
will have to be paid over the value of the warrant. Two
variants exist:
1) the "interest variant" (in Dutch: "rente variant" or "pari
variant");
2) the "combination variant" (in Dutch: "combinatie variant"
or "disagio variant").
ad. 1) "The interest variant".
If the conditions of the warrant-bond loan do not explicitly
mention that part of the issue-price is paid for the warrant,
the bond is assumed to be issued at 100~, and the warrant is
considered as an interest income received in advance. The
warrant-bond purchaser will have to pay income taxes over the
value of the warrant in the year of purchase. In case an
income tax exempt company buys the warrant-bond package and
sells the "naked" bonds to a private person, the latter has
to pay an annual tax over the par value of the bonds44.
ad. 2) "The combination variant".
If the conditions of the warrant-bond loan explicitly state
that a specified amount is paid for the bond, and a specified
amount is paid for the warrant, the bond is considered to be
issued at a discount. In that case interest will have to be
paid over the difference between the issue-price and the
redemption price, at the redemption date45.33
The difference between these variants can be illustrated for
our company H. If the "interest variant" is applied, taxes
have to be paid over the value of the warrants, i.e. f
155.54, on the issue date. If the "combination variant" is
applied taxes have to be paid over the discount value of the
bonds, which is also f 155.54, on the redemPtion date.
Tempelaar (1986, page 269) provides an equation to calculate
the present value of this difference in interest payment46:
W
PV(i) - c ~W - (1 f kb)n ~ (6)
where:
PV(i) - present value of the difference in interest payment;
c - marginal income tax rate;
W - value of the warrants;
kb - cost of debt (market interest rate);
n - difference in period of interest payment.
Assuming a marginal tax rate of 40~, the present value of the
difference in interest payment is f 32.59 per warrant-bond
package47.
The warrant-resolution caused a problem for holders of
warrant-bond packages issued by companies before the text of
the resolution was released48. Holders of these warrant-bond
packages had to pay interest in advance, because the text of
the prospect did not mention that part of the issue-price was
paid for the bonds and part of the issue-price was paid for
the warrants. Therefore the fiscal authorities applied the
"interest variant".
ii) Tax aspects for the issuer.
Van Sonderen (1988) explains the fiscal effects of the issue
of a warrant-bond loan by showing how the warrants and the
bonds are included on the fiscal balance-sheet.
If the "interest-variant" is applied, the following balance-
sheet results with regard to the warrant and the bond
(Company H).34
Balance-sheet Company H
Cash f 1,000 Bonds f 1,000
Znterest paid-in-
advance f 155.54 Warrant-capital f 155.54
f 1,155.54 f 1,155.54
As interest expenses are recoqnized the coupon interest (each
year 11~~ of 1,000 - 112.50) and the periodic amortization of
the interest paid-in-advance. This amortization49 varies
from f 22.61 in year 1 to f 40.92 in year 5. After 5 years
the component of interest paid-in-advance is reduced to zero.
In the warrant-resolution the Parliamentary Undersecretary
of Finance states that the "warrant-capital"-component can be
considered as a payment of "informal capital" (in Dutch:
"informeel kapitaal")50. Hofman (1988) argues that the
warrant-resolution can also be applied to convertible bond-
loans. Therefore he argues that the value of conversion
rights can also be considered as informal capital.
If the "combination variant" is applied, according to Van
Sonderen (1988), the following balance sheet results for the
warrants and the bonds (Company H).
Balance-sheet Company H
Cash f 1,000 Bonds f 844.46
Warrant-capital f 155.54
f 1,000 f 1,000
In this case debt is recorded under subtraction of the issue
discount. The recognized interest expenses are the same as
under the "interest variant", i.e. the coupon interest of f
112.50 per year and the periodic amortization of the issue
discount, calculated as above. Altogether the tax-
deductibility of interest expenses does not differ for the
"interest-variant" and the "combination variant".35
The warrant-resolution does not mention how "warrant-capital"
must be considered in case the "combination-variant" is
applied.
iii) Conclusion.
We can conclude that, as far as we know, fiscal aspects do
not offer a rationale for the use of convertible bonds and
warrant-bond packages, that does not already exist for more
conventional finance instruments, such as ordinary debt, or
(common stock) equity. However, before the Parliamentary
Undersecretary of Finance revealed details of the forthcoming
warrant-resolution in May 1985 companies might have thought
that investors buying their warrant-bond packages could avoïd
paying taxes over the value of the warrants51. In that case,
before 1985 a motive might have existed for the use of low
interest bearing warrant-bond packages, based on a supposed
"tax advantage".
The same reasoning applies to the sale of warrant-bond
packages issued under the "interest variant" to income tax
exempt investors, in order to pass the "naked bonds" to
private persons. This might have been considered as a"tax-
friendly" transaction, until the Parliamentary
Undersecretary of Finance launched his press release in May
1985.
Finally we mention the fact that, according to Hezemans
(1987), the tax authorities do not always succeed in tracing
low-interest bearing warrant-bond loans. Therefore many
purchasers of warrant-bond packages may have avoided paying
income-taxes over the value of the warrants. In 1987,
Hezemans (1987) estimated the tax-loss resulting from
untraced warrant-bond loans at 50 million guilders.
2.4.8. The case of undervalued stock.
According to Brennan and Schwartz ( 1986) some companies
prefer to issue convertible debt if they think that their36
stock is undervalued52. Brennan and Schwartz (1986) argue
that in such a case the convertible bonds will be less
undervalued than the stock. We argue that this will not
necessarily be the case. The question whether convertibles
are less undervalued than the stock depends on the relation
of the straight debt value of the convertible bond to the
value of the warrant part of the convertible. Jones and Mason
(1986) argue that if the equity is undervalued, the warrants
will also be undervalued. In fact, since warrants are like a
"levered security", they will be undervalued by a greater
percentage than the equity itself. Therefore we argue that if
the convertible has a relatively large warrant-component, it
may be possible that the convertible will be more undervalued
than the stock.
Brennan and Schwartz (1986) and Jones and Mason (1986) argue
that in case equity is undervalued, it is preferable to issue
straight debt, because straight debt will either not be
undervalued, or be less undervalued than both stock and
convertible bonds. Therefore Jones and Mason (1986) argue
that only if it is impossible to issue straight debt,
convertibles may be preferred over equity. We notice that in
such a case the warrant component must not be too large,
because in that case the undervaluation of the "levered
securities" will be more than the undervaluation of the
common stock itself. In the latter case an issue of common
stock might be preferable.
2 4 9 The case of overvalued stock.
Brennan and Schwartz (1986) also discuss the case in which
the underlying stock is significantly overpriced. Their
reasoning applied to our example of Company H is as follows.
Suppose, for example, that the stock of Company H at f 50 is
so overpriced that management will be sure that the bond
will not be converted. By issuing the convertible, the
company would be selling 16 percent debt at a cost of only
il~ percent. Brennan and Schwartz (1986, page 165) notice37
that this is certainly an attractive proposition. However,
they argue:
"But how often can management be sure that the conversion
option is worthless, unless they are fraudulently concealing
information about the company? Moreover, in such
circumstances it would almost certainly be better to sell the
overpriced stock itself".
We find the reasoning of Brennan and schwartz (1986)
incomplete at best. In the preceding subsection we have
already argued that a warrant is a"levered security".
Therefore in case the stock is overvalued, warrants will be
overvalued by a greater percentage than the equity itself. If
the convertible bond has a large warrant component, it might
be better to sell convertible bonds, than to sell the stock
itself. We also argue that management need not be sure that
the conversion option is worthless. The fact that the
conversion option is "worth less" than the price the market
is willing to pay for it, may be reason enough to issue
convertible bonds. Therefore we argue that in case the
companies stock is overpriced, a convertible bond issue might
be appropriate. Even better, of course, would be an issue of
"naked warrants".
2.4.10. Market incompleteness.
Convertible bonds and warrant-bond packages may serve a role
in making the market more complete.
Brigham (1966) argues that a number of institutional
investors (life insurance companies, certain pension funds,
banks, and so on) are severely restricted in their ability to
hold common stocks53. The investment officers of many of
these institutions are thought to feel that it would be
desirable to have more equities than regulations permit.
According to Brigham (1966) convertible bonds provide these
intermediaries with a method of indirectly holding more
equities than the law permits. This idea is supported by
Brigham's questionnaire, discussed in section 2.2.1. From38
this questionnaire resulted that 14~ of the financial
officers mentioned the institutional motive as an additional
motive (besides one of the other motives). In this context it
would be interesting to investigate to what extent Dutch
financial institutions are restricted to hold equities, and
in case there are restrictions, whether these institutions
consider convertible bonds (or warrant-bond packages) as an
alternative for common stock.
Another possibility is that (other) financial institutions
are forbidden to hold call-options (traded on the European
Options Exchange), but have the possibility to invest in
warrants, in case the latter are traded on the Official
Market. If this were the case warrants would be a suitable
instrument to make the market more complete.
With regard to the preference for convertible bonds by
financial institutions Brigham (1966) argues that it is
possible that this might, in effect, shift the supply curve
for funds placed in the convertible market to the right, thus
lowering the cost for convertibles. However, he also
considers the possibility that companies would be "oversold"
on the use of convertibles, thus causing them to demand an
excessive amount of funds through such issues, and making the
cost of convertible capital relatively more expensive than
other types. Brigham (1966) admits that there is no evidence
to suggest that institutional factors create a favourable or
unfavorable situation for convertibles. His personal idea,
however, is that these institutional factors are probably
favourable on balance, but decidly second order in
importance.
Brennan and Schwartz (1986) argue that capital market
behaviour will show that firms in aggregate supply enough
convertibles to satisfy the demand of institutional
investors, so that there are no "scarcity rents", or in this
case, major cost reductions.
Whether Brigham (1966) or Brennan and Schwartz (1986) are
right is an interesting topic for future research. In order
to confirm Brigham's (1966) idea, future research should39
indicate that convertibles and~or warrants can be issued at a
higher price than should be expected based on their risk-
return characteristics (in that case firms can sell
convertibles and~or warrants at a"relatively" low cost). The
research should, of course, also indicate that financial
institutions are responsible for these higher than normal
prices.
In this context it is interesting to notice that an empirical
research by Veld and Verboven (1991), based on the Dutch
capital market, indicates that warrants are overvalued in
relation to call-options. A similar research for convertibles
is more complicated because of the non-separability of the
bond and the conversion right54. It is interesting to notice
that both Duffhues (1990) and Harbrink Numan (1990) suggest
that this overvaluation of warrants in relation to call-
options may be explained by institutional motives, such as
described above. Whether this is really the case, is a
matter that needs future attention.
In additional empirical research Veld (1991b) compares model-
and market prices for warrants. The model prices are
calculated using a historical estimate for the standard
deviation. From this research he concludes that on average
market prices are much higher than model prices. The outcome
of this research is especially interesting, because similar
studies for respectively the US and Germany, by respectively
Noreen and Wolfson (1981) and Schulz and Trautmann (1989) do
not show such an overvaluation. In addition it is mentioned
that a study by Stucki and Wasserfallen (1989) for Swiss
warrants shows a much lower overvaluation than the
overvaluation found by Veld (1991b). Therefore it seems
reasonable to conclude that Dutch warrants are not only
overvalued in relation to long term call-options, but also in
relation to foreign warrants.
2.5. Conclusion.
In this section motives for the use of convertible bonds have40
been discussed, that are also applicable to warrant-bond
packages. In the next section the company's choice between
issues of convertible bonds and warrant-bond packages on one
side and puttable common stock on the other side will be
discussed.
3. The choice between convertible bonds and warrant-bond
packaaes versus outtable common stock.
3.1. Introduction.
A finance instrument that is closely related to warrant-bond
packages and convertible bonds is the combination of a share
of common stock and a put-warrant, allowing the holder to
redeem the share at a specified exercise price55. Chen and
Kensinger (1988) refer to the combination of shares and put-
warrants as "puttable common stock". According to Chen and
Kensinger (1988) a puttable common stock arrangement is
generally constructed in a manner that the difference between
the exercise price of the put-warrant and the common stock
price prevailing at the expiration date is made up by giving
the holder shares, cash, bonds or preferred shares.
In sub-section 2.4.3 we have mentioned the put-call parity,
which states that the pay-off of a share of common stock and
a put-option is equal to the pay-off of a zero-coupon bond
and a call-option. Using this put-call parity Chen and
Kensinger (1988) demonstrate that the pay-off of a
convertible bond is equal to the pay-off of a puttable common
stock arrangement. Although the pay-offs of these finance
instruments are the same it is possible to identify some
differences that favour an issue of puttable common stock and
other differences that favour an issue of convertible bonds.
Because the advantages and disadvantages of warrant-bond
packages are the same as the advantages and disadvantages of
convertible bonds, in thís section the term convertible bond
also refers to warrant-bond packages.
The only issue of puttable common stock in the Netherlands41
was an issue of puttable common stock by "AOT Finance" in
1985. In that year AOT Finance introduced shares of common
stock with non-separable put-warrants on the Parallel Market
of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. On July 15, 1985 AOT Finance
sold puttable common stock for f 30, entitling the holders to
redeem the shares of a price of f 25 at January 29 or January
30, 1987.
In section 3.2 we will see that convertible bonds have
advantages over puttable common stock arrangements which are
based on market imperfections, i.e. fiscal and legal
advantages. In section 3.3 advantages and disadvantages of
puttable common stock will be discussed. These are also based
on market imperfections, i.e. a reduction in liquidation and
agency costs as well as accounting benefits.
3.2. Advantaaes of convertible bonds over puttable common
stock.
3.2.1. A fiscal advantaQe: the deductibility of interest
costs.
Puttable common stock has an important tax disadvantage
compared to convertible bonds. This tax-disadvantage is based
on the fact that in case of convertible bonds the firm enjoys
a tax deduction for the interest paid. If on the other hand
the firm issues puttable common stock, it does not pay
interest and therefore it does not enjoy such a tax
reduction. Therefore puttable common stock will in practice
especially be used by tax-exempt investors.
3.2.2. Legal restrictions to the use of put-warrants whereas
there are no legal restrictions to the use of convertibles.
Even in case a firm would, notwithstanding the unfavorable
tax treatment prefer puttable common stock, caution should be
exercised in determining the conditions for the puttable
common stock arrangement, because according to Van Westen42
(1990) Dutch companies are prohibited from writing put-
warrants on their own shares. This is probably the reason
that AOT Finance, at its issue of puttable common stock in
1985, created a special foundation which arranged the
possible share repurchase. This foundation had received a
special guarantee from the Dutch bank "Pierson, Aeldring en
Pierson" for the repurchase obligations.
3 3 Advantaaes of puttable common stock over convertible
bonds.
3.3.1. A reduction in liquidation costs.
The fact that the issuer of puttable common stock has the
possibility to fix a payment in cash, bonds, common stock or
preferred stock, is an important advantage of this finance
instrument. Chen and Kensinger (1988) argue that this
possibility increases the efficiency associated with the
transfer of obligations that takes place in the event of
default. In case the company keeps open the possibility to
pay off the difference in shares of common stock or preferred
stock, the cost of a substantial liquidation can be avoided.
These costs can not be avoided in case the difference has to
be paid in cash. Chen and Kensinger (1988) argue that,
ceteris paribus, this greater efficiency should be reflected
in a higher price paid for puttable stock, in relation to
convertible bonds, at the time of the issue.
3.3.2. The resolution of specific agency problems.
The second advantage of puttable common stock, mentioned by
Chen and Kensinger (1988), is that it can resolve specific
agency problems, which can not be solved by the use of
convertible bonds. As an example Chen and Kensinger (1988)
mention the case of General Motors, a company that issued "E-
class" common stock, whose dividends are pegged to the
performance of a specific division. In such a case the common43
stock of a company is divided over different owners who
receive differential rewards, although the company is
controlled by one single management. Chen and Kensinger
(1988) argue that these groups have conflicting interests,
therefore agency problems exist. As a solution they suggest
to make the special class of stock puttable to the parent
company. In such a case the owners will be assured of redress
in the event of adverse decisions by the upper management,
and therefore they will be willing to pay a higher price for
the special class of stock.
3.3.3. The treatment of puttable common stock as equitv
The last advantage of puttable common stock identified by
Chen and Kensinger (1988) is the fact that, although puttable
common stock is a hybrid security, it may, unlike convertible
debt, be recorded as equity on the balance sheet. Chen and
Kensinger (1988) argue that although the market knows that
puttable common stock is a hybrid security it is still more
advantageous to present it on the balance sheet as equity
instead of debt. In addition Chen and Kensinger (1988) argue
that a firm which projects the appearance of financial
strength may enjoy more advantageous relations with customers
and suppliers. With regard to this argument we recall
Finnerty's (1986) argument, presented in sub-section 2.4.6,
that it is doubtful that financial reporting benefits per se
can have a significant and lasting impact on the stock market
value of a company.
3.4. Conclusion.
In this section puttable common stock has been discussed.
Although the pay-off of a puttable common stock arrangement
is the same as the pay-off of convertible bonds and warrant-
bond packages, both market imperfections in favour of
puttable common stock on one side and market imperfections in
favour of convertible bonds and warrant-bond packages on the44
other side can be identified. In the next section we will
discuss the difference in motives for convertible bonds and
warrant-bond packages.
4. The choice between convertible bonds and warrant-bond
packaQes.
4.1. Introduction.
In this section we will discuss the company's choice between
a convertible bond issue and an issue of warrant-bond
packages. In order to get an idea of the popularity of
warrant-bond loans and convertible bond loans in the Dutch
capital markets we present in table 7 the number of warrant-
bond loans and convertible bond loans issued by Dutch
companies in the Netherlands from January 1, 1976 until
December 31, 199056. From table 7 it can be concluded that
from 1976 to 1990 almost twice as many convertible bond loans
as warrant-bond loans were issued. The popularity of
convertible bonds is quite stable over the years, with a peak
in the years 1985 and 1986. Since 1983 warrant-bond loans
have also gained some popularity.
In section 4.2 we will see that warrant-bond packages have
some flexibility advantages over convertible bonds. Besides
these flexibility differences it is also possible to identify
market imperfections that favour an issue of warrant-bond
packages over an issue of convertible bonds and vice versa.
In section 4.3 market imperfections that favour warrant-bond
packages over convertible bonds will be discussed and in
section 4.4 we will study the opposite case.45
Table 7: Number of warrant-bond loans and convertible bond
loans issued by Dutch companies in the Dutch capital markets
from Januarv 1 1976 until December 31 1990
Year Number of warrant- Number of conver-

















4.2. Extra possibilities in case of the warrant-bond loan.
Based on the fact that a warrant-bond package consists of two
separate securities, while a convertible bond is one security
in which the features of two securities are combined, two
flexibility advantages exist in case of a warrant-bond loan:
- the holder of a warrant-bond package has more possibilities
than the holder of a convertible bond;
- it is possible for the issuing company to attract equity46
from warrant exercise while the accompanying bonds are
still outstanding.
These flexibility advantages of warrant-bond loans will be
discussed in two separate sub-sections.
4 2 1 A difference from the investors view- detachabilitv
versus non-detachability.
The holder of a warrant-bond package has more options
available with regard to the tradeability of his securities
than a convertible bond holder has. While the purchaser of a
convertible bond can:
1) sell the bond and the warrant;
2) hold the bond and the warrant;
3) convert the bond and the warrant into common stock;
the holder of the warrant-bond package can:
1) sell both;
2) hold both;
3) sell the bond and hold the warrant;
4) hold the bond and sell the warrant;
5) sell the bond and exercise the warrant;
6) hold the bond and exercise the warrant.
Options (1), (2) and (5) of the warrant-bond package are
analogous to the choices open to the holder of the
convertible bond. The others are available only to the holder
of the warrant-bond package. Therefore the investor is able
to profit from attention on two markets: the market of the
"quiet" investors in fixed-interest bearing securities and
the market of the more "speculative" investors.
With respect to this difference the issuing company has got a
real benefit in case of the warrant-bond package over the
convertible bond, because it will generally be indifferent
to this free trade-ability, while it can demand a higher
price for a warrant-bond package than for a similar
convertible bond as a compensation for the inclusion of
options (3), (4) and (6).47
4.2.2. The possibility to attract equity from warrant
exercise while the accombanying bonds are still outstanding.
Cremers (1979, pages 111-113 and 1980) argues that firms have
a possibility to incorporate flexibility in the warrant-
conditions, that does not exist in case of a convertible bond
loan, because it is possible to attract equity from warrant
exercise while the accompanying bonds are still
outstanding57. According to Cremers (1979, page 111) this is
interesting in the sense that only one issue is necessary to
attract debt and later when the debt is still (partly)
outstanding also attract equity. This possibility does not
exist in case of a convertible bond issue. In the latter case
conversion both leads to a creation of equity, and a
disappearance of debt. We will refer to this advantage of the
warrant-bond loan as a"liquidity-advantage", because
exercise of the warrants results in an improvement of the
liquidity. We notice, however, that this advantage also
requires extra transaction costs compared with the issue of
convertible bonds. In the latter case debt is exchanged for
equity, while in case of the warrant-bond loan equity is
attracted by the warrant exercise and only after a while debt
is redeemed. This incurs transaction costs to be paid twice.
This liquidity advantage was probably the most important
motive for AT6T in 1970 to prefer a warrant-bond loan over a
convertible bond loan. ATá~T issued warrants with a maturity
of 5 years in combination with bonds, having a maturity of 30
years. According to Scanlon (1972, page 25), the treasurer of
ATáT, his firm needed extra cash from 1968 as a consequence
of a change in the production program. By attracting a bond
loan the direct cash requirement could be fulfilled. The
warrants would (if exercised) result in a future improvement
of the liquidity and solvency. With an issue size of 1.57
milliard dollars ATb~T placed the largest warrant-bond loan
in the period from World War II to 1970. The ATá~T issue even
led the New York Stock Exchange to abolish its prohibition
(dating from 1919) against warrant-listing.48
We have examined whether this liquidity advantage was also
relevant for Dutch firms. In table 8 data with regard to the
maturity of the bonds and the warrants have been collected.
Table 8: Maturities of
rhe accomAanvina bonds
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12.00 years 8.50 years 1.41
0.33 years 13.00 years 0.03
10.33 years 13.00 years 0.79
1.08 years 10.50 years 0.10
1.54 years 10.50 years 0.15
3.00 years 8.00 years 0.38
2.92 years 8.50 years 0.34
0.08 years 8.00 years 0.01
4.88 years 8.00 years 0.61
5.00 years 7.00 years 0.71
3.00 years 10.00 years 0.30
3.04 years 8.50 years 0.36
5.00 years 7.00 years 0.71
2.79 years 8.50 years 0.33
7.00 years 12.83 years 0.55
5.00 years 10.00 years 0.50
4.88 years 8.00 years 0.61
3.25 years 6.50 years 0.50
5.25 years 6.50 years 0.81
10.00 years 10.00 years 1.00
7.00 years 7.00 years 1.00
3.96 years 10.50 years 0.38
9.96 years 10.50 years 0.95
war. B49
v Ommeren '87 war. A 3.00 years 8.50 years 0.35
war. B 5.00 years 8.50 years 0.59
Stork '87 4.88 years 8.00 years 0.61
KNP '89 4.66 years 4.99 years 0.93
Cremers (1979, page 112) suggests that the quotient of the
maturity of the warrants (A) and the average maturity of the
bonds (B) may give an indication for the use of this
liquidity advantage. In 18 cases this quotient (A~B) appeared
to be smaller than 1. This means that most firms that issued
warrant-bond packages wanted equity resulting from warrant
exercise before debt had to be repaid. In only 2 cases the
maturity of the warrants equalled the average maturity of the
bonds (A~B -1) . The only warrant-bond loan that had an A~B-
factor larger than 1 was the issue by Nationale Nederlanden
in 1976. In that case the firm apparently needed equity
after the average maturity of the bonds had passed. It is
also interesting to notice that in 6 out of 21 cases 2
warrant-types were issued in combination with bonds. In such
a case the firm does not have 2 issues in mind, a direct
issue of warrants followed by a future issue of equity, but 3
issues, an issue of bonds and two future issues of equity.
4.3. Motives for the use of warrant-bond loans over
convertíble bond loans based on market imperfections.
The following market imperfections favour an issue of
warrant-bond packages over an issue of convertible bonds:
- the reduction of specific marketing costs;
- the possibility to swap the accompanying bonds;
- a larger choice in accounting possibilities;
- more favourable stock price reactions at the announcement
date.
These market imperfections will be discussed in separate sub-
sections.50
4 3 1 The reduction of specific marketina costs.
One reason for the preference of warrant-bond loans over
convertible bond-loans is that specific marketing costs can
be reduced. The nature of these costs and the reason that
they are referred to as marketing costs will be explained
below.
Besides the flexibility advantage mentioned in sub-section
4.2.1 Cremers (1979, pages 111-113, and 1980) also mentions a
flexibility advantage that does not exist in case of a
convertible bond loan without an additional- or repayment:
the fixation of an unequal amount of potential equity
resulting from warrant exercise and debt in the form of the
face value of the bonds. With regard to this advantage we
notice that no real flexibility advantage exists if the
possibility of additional payment or repayment is considered
in case of a convertible bond loan. If in case of a
convertible bond loan, the firm includes such an additional
or repayment arrangement, management has the possibility to
easily fix an unequal amount of debt and potential equity. In
practice, firms that issue convertible bonds, do not use this
possibility very often. A research under the 40 convertible
bond loans issued in the Netherlands from January 1, 1976
until December 31, 1990 showed that in only 3 cases an
additional payment was included in the conversion arrangement
and that in only 2 cases a repayment agreement was
included58. Therefore, in the other 35 cases the amount of
debt equalled the amount of potential equity.
A research under 21 warrant-bond loans showed that in all
cases an unequal amount of debt and potential equity was
fixed. In 13 cases the amount of potential equity was
smaller than the amount of debt. This difference was
especially large in case of the warrant-bond loan issued by
Bredero Verenigde Bedrijven in 1985. Bredero attracted 35
million guilders by issuing the bonds, while potential equity
from warrant-exercise would not be more than 7 million
guilders. The best example of a firm that wished to attract51
more potential equity than debt was the issue made by Amro
Bank in 1986. Amro Bank attracted 244 million guilders of
debt, while the amount of potential equity was 360 million
guilders.
From our research we conclude that although the flexibility
advantage of the warrant-bond loan to fix an unequal amount
of equity and potential debt can be duplicated in case of a
convertible bond loan, this is only seldom done. A similar
problem is identified by Finnerty (1986) who notices that
warrant-bond packages contain a certain tax-advantage in the
United States over convertible bonds. He describes how to
package a unit consisting of debt and warrants into
"synthetic convertible debt", the features of which mirror
the features of conventional convertible debt. In practice,
Finnerty (1986) argues, this technique is not often applied.
One potential obstacle Finnerty (1986) identifies is that
issuers may be reluctant to deviate from the more typical
convertible bond structure, even when there are advantages to
do so. Finnerty (1986) considers this as a marketing
consideration.
A similar argument is presented in a larger framework by Ross
(1989), who argues that marketing performs an important role
in finance. The argument of Ross (1989, page 543) is as
follows:
"If we think of markets as the perfect and frictionless
markets of neoclassical finance, than there is really no role
for marketing per se. Selling a financial instrument in a
frictionless market is, by definition, costless. However, of
course, in practice the less familiar and the more esoteric
the instrument, the more costly it is to sell it".
This argument explains why convertibles do no often contain
an additional payment or repayment clause. The fact that
capital markets have not, or only seldom, been confronted
with this special feature, brings certain marketing expenses
with them.52
4 3 2 The possibility to swap the bonds.
According to Van Westen (1990), treasurer of the Dutch
company KNP, a disadvantage of the convertible bond-loan is
the fact that, due to early conversion, the bond-loan may
disappear. This causes the maturity of the bonds to be
uncertain. In case of warrant-bond packages the warrants and
the bonds are separately tradeable. Therefore it is possible
to swap the debt into another currency (currency swap) or to
swap only the interest streams (interest rate swap). This
advantage was used by KNP in 1989, when this company placed
part of its bond-loan, issued in combination with warrants,
in Switzerland. Because future warrant-exercise would not
influence the maturity of the bonds, KNP had the possibility
to swap the bonds, denominated in Swiss Francs, into Dutch
guilders, thereby avoiding currency risk. Notice that this
possibility only offers a real advantage if the use of swaps
is favoured by market imperfections, market inefficiencies or
market incompleteness.
4 3 3 A larQer choice in accounting possibilities.
In section 2.4.6 accounting aspects of convertible bonds and
warrant-bond packages have been discussed. Issuers of
convertible bonds are obliged to apply the "par method",
while issuers of warrant-bond packages have the possibility
to choose between the "par method" and the "discount method".
We have also seen that the "par method" offers the issuing
company a relative advantage over the "discount method",
because it comes to a higher "return on net worth". However,
the "par method" also comes to a higher "debt-ratio", which
is a disadvantage of this method.
In practice companies tend to be more concerned over their
"profit and loss account" than over their "balance sheet".
This is confirmed in practice, because in sub-section 2.4.6
we have seen that issuers of warrant-bond packages generally
use the "par method". The fact that the issuing company has53
the possibility to choose between the "par method" and the
"discount method", therefore only seems to be of little
importance. Only for companies, that suffer from a very high
debt-ratio this possibility may have some significance.
4.3.4. More favourable stock price reactions to announcements
of issues of warrant-bond packacres than to announcements of
issues of convertible bonds.
Many papers in finance literature are devoted to the reaction
of shareholders on announcements of security-issues. In these
studies the common stock return from the day before the issue
is announced (day -1) to the announcement day (day 0) is
determined. The difference between this return and the
"normal return" on the same stock is considered as an
"abnormal return". In a review of these studies, Smith (1986)
concludes that the abnormal returns are on average largely
negative in case common stock is issued (-3.14g for
industrial firms and -0.75~ for utilities), while in case
straight debt is offered, only small negative abnormal
returns occur on average (-0.26~ for industrial firms and
-0.13~ for utilities).
In several studies the abnormal returns are calculated for
issues of convertible bonds and warrant-bond packages. In
table 9 the average abnormal returns found in these studies
are summarized. From this table it can be concluded that in
case convertible bonds are issued, a negative stock price
reaction occurs. Although, because of the fact that
practically all convertible bonds were issued by industrial
firms, it can be concluded that the negative reaction is on
average much smaller than in case common stock is issued,
which was reported by Smith (1986) to be -3.14~ on average.54
Table 9: Stock nrice reactions to the announce5ent ,~of
convertible debt and warrant-bond packaQe offerings.













Conv. bonds 1970-1979 132 -2.31~ ~~
Conv. bonds 1972-1982 33 -1.97~ ~~
Conv. bonds 1964-1981 75 -1.25g ~~
Conv. bonds 1965-1984 134 -0.61g ~~
Warrant,bond
packages 1965-1984 54 -1.59~ ~~
Conv. bonds 1971-1986 104 -2.04~ ~~
Warrant~bond
packages 1971-1986 38 -0.33~
~- reported by the authors as being significant at the 5~-
level;
~~ - reported by the authors as being significant at the 1~-
level.
One of the few explanations for these negative returns that
can be confirmed by empirical data is a conjecture by
Mikkelson and Partch (1986). These authors argue that
managers issue common stock or convertible debt when in
manager's view shares are overpriced. Mikkelson and Partch
(1986) find their conjecture confirmed by the fact that a
negative price reaction occurs if the offering of common
stock or convertible debt definitively takes place, while a
positive reaction occurs if the issue is cancelled. The
conjecture of Mikkelson and Partch (1986) is contradicted by
evidence from Billingsley, Lamy and Smith (1990) that only a
small (insignificant) abnormal return occurs if warrant-
bond packages are issued (see table 9). Based on this
evidence Billingsley, Lamy and Smith (1990) refer to an issue
of warrant-bond packages as the "penalty-free" issuance of an
equity-like security. This suggests that warrant-bond
packages have an advantage over convertible bonds, because of
the smaller negative stock price reaction. However, Long and55
Sefcik (1990) find a much larger negative stock price
reaction for an issue of warrant-bond packages than for an
issue of convertible bonds (see table 9). This in turn
contradicts the evidence found by Billingsley, Lamy and
Smith (1990).
We conclude thís sub-section by arguing that further
empirical research is necessary to fully comprehend the
effects of issues of convertible bonds and warrant-bond
packages. If issues of warrant-bond packages lead, as Long
and Sefcik (1990) suggest, to a negative abnormal return, we
suggest a possible method for the further investigation of
the Mikkelson and Partch (1986) conjecture to study the
stock price reactions in case issues of "naked warrants" or
share-warrant packages are announced. Because in sub-section
2.4.9 it has been argued that in case common stock is
overvalued, warrants will be overvalued by an even greater
percentage, the conjecture of Mikkelson and Partch (1986)
would require a larger negative abnormal return from an issue
of "naked warrants" or share-warrant packages than from an
issue of convertible bonds or common stock.
4.4. Motives for the use of convertible bond loans over
warrant-bond loans based on market imtierfections.
The following market imperfections favour an issue of
convertible bonds over an issue of warrant-bond packages:
- the reduction of specific marketing costs;
- lower flotation costs;
- alleged fiscal benefits;
- a better image relative to warrant-bond packages.
These market imperfections will be discussed in separate sub-
sections.
4.4.1. The reduction of specific marketing costs.
Copeland and Weston (1988, page 478) argue that convertible
bonds may be preferred over warrant-bond packages, because56
convertible bonds often have a call provision built in that
allows a firm to force conversion. Because of this early
redemption clause investors do not have the possibility to
fully profit from the capital gain on the underlying stock60.
Of course investors in efficient markets include this
possibility in the price they are willing to pay for the
convertible bond at the day of its issuance. From a research
under the 40 convertible bond-issues that took place from
1976 to 1990 we conclude that in 38 cases the possibility of
early redemption was included in the convertible bond
agreement6l.
With regard to the remark of Copeland and Weston (1988, page
478) we notice that a firm that issues warrant-bond packages
can also include the possibility to call the warrants. From a
research under all warrant-issues mentioned in table 1, which
do not only include issues of warrant-bond packages but also
issues of warrants for miscellaneous reasons, we conclude
that in 4 out of 42 cases the firm had the possibility to
call the warrants. This was the case with the issues of
warrants for cash by Akzo in 1986, VNU and Atag Holding in
1988 and Furness in 1989. If a warrant is called, the warrant
holders must choose at the call-date, this is a moment in
time that lies before the expiration date, to exercise the
warrant rights or to leave them unexpired62.
It is remarkable that the possibility of early redemption is
very popular for convertible bonds, while the call-provision
has only seldom been applied to warrants. In sub-section
4.3.1 we saw that only few companies that issued convertible
bonds, included the possibility of an additional or
repayment. We contributed this to the existence of marketing
costs. This argument also explains why so few companies
include the possibility to call the warrants. It also
explains why the popularity of including a call provision has
grown since Akzo introduced this special feature in the
Netherlands. After (most) marketing costs were borne by Akzo,
it has become less expensive for VNU, Atag Holding and
Furness to incorporate this possibility63.57
4.4.2. Lower flotation costs.
Long and Sefcik (1990) argue that different flotation costs
exist for issues of warrant-bond packages in relation to
convertible bond-issues. From official publications they
derive the direct underwriters spreads (from now on spreads)
for 121 issues of convertible bonds and 45 issues of warrant-
bond packages, made in the USA between 1965 and 1984. These
spreads are calculated as the difference between the offering
price and the net proceeds to the firm. This difference is
expressed in the net proceeds. From these calculations Long
and Sefcik (1990) conclude that the average spreads for the
convertible bond-issues are 1.8~ 64, while the average
spreads for the issues of warrant-bond packages are 3.4.~ 65.
Although, also other factors such as the size of the issue
and the risk of the issuing company determine the level of
the spreads, from a multiple regression analysis Long and
Sefcik (1990) conclude that the most important factor
responsible for the level of the spreads is the type of the
issue, in other words the choice between the warrant-bond
package and convertible bonds. This choice turned out to be
responsible for a difference ín spreads of 1.26 percentage
points. As explanations for the higher spreads of warrant-
bond packages in relation to convertible bonds, Long and
Sefcik (1990} mention:
1) in case of a warrant-bond issue more parameters have to be
estimated;
2) underwriters set spreads separately for warrants and
bonds, while this is not done for convertible bonds;
3) in the US a warrant bond-package is taxable more complex,
which involves extra administration costs for the
underwriter.
Unfortunately no official publication of the spreads exists
for Dutch issues, therefore it is not possible to investigate
whether also differences in spreads exist between Dutch
issues of warrant-bond packages and convertible bonds.58
4.4.3. Alleged fiscal benefits.
In section 2.4.7 we have already concluded that in principle
the tax-treatment of convertible bonds and warrant-bond
packages does not differ. However, Van der Geld (1990) argues
that in gractice the warrant-resolution has until "recently"
not been applied to convertible bonds66. Therefore durinq
some years companies might have thought that they could avoid
the consequences of the warrant-resolution if convertibles
would be issued, instead of warrant-bond packages. However,
we think that in practice the difference in tax treatment has
not greatly influenced the choice between a convertible bond
loan and a warrant-bond loan.
4 4 4 A"financial weakness imaue" of warrant-bond
packages.
In sub-sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1 the marketing costs of
introducing special features in convertible bond loans and
warrant-bond packages are discussed. Another marketing
aspect is discussed by Finnerty (1986). In an informal survey
under seven of the largest American institutional investors
in convertible bonds Finnerty (1986) concludes that all of
these investors associate debt with warrants packages with
smaller riskier companies, which issue warrants primarily to
"sweeten" a straight debt offering rather than to create a
convertible bond substitute. Therefore Finnerty (1986, page
81) concludes:
"Debt with warrants, then, may as yet suffer from an image
problem. Prospective investors, and perhaps prospective
issuers also, may view warrants accompanying a debt package
as a sign of financial weakness".
This conjecture is empirically tested by Long and Sefcik
(1990) and Billingsley, Lamy and Smith (1990). After
comparing characteristics of firms that issue convertible
bonds and warrant-bond packages, both Long and Sefcik (1990)
and Billingsley, Lamy and Smith (1990) conclude that firms59
issuing warrant-bond packages are riskier and smaller than
firms that issue convertible bonds. Therefore both Long and
Sefcik (1990) and Billingsley, Lamy and Smith (1990)
investigate whether different abnormal returns between groups
of convertible bond-issues and warrant-bond packages exist.
Long and Sefcik (1990) do not find a significant difference
between groups, while Billingsley, Lamy and Smith (1990) find
that convertible bonds come to significant higher abnormal
negative returns compared to warrant-bond packages. Therefore
both studies conclude that the use of warrant-bond packages
can not be considered as a sign of financial weakness.
4.5. Conclusion.
In this section we have seen that, because of the separate
tradeability of warrants and bonds, a flexibility advantage
exists for the holder as well as the issuer of warrant-bond
packages. These advantages do not exist for convertible
bonds. Besides that, several market imperfections favour an
issue of warrant-bond packages over an issue of convertible
bonds. On the other hand also market imperfections can be
identified that favour an issue of convertible bonds over an
issue of warrant-bond packages. In the next section we will
discuss motives for the use of share-warrant packages.
5 Motives for the use of share-warrant packages.
It is possible to increase the price of a share of common
stock by adding a warrant to it. An example is the issue of
packages consisting of shares of common stock and warrants,
from now on share-warrant packages, by the Dutch company Akzo
in 1983. Akzo received 53s guilders for each share-warrant
package, while according to Meeuwis (1983), the issue-price
for naked shares would not have been higher than 47 guilders.
Therefore the warrants were implicitly issued for a price of
approximately 6~ guilders.
Contrary to the vast amount of literature on motives for the60
use of convertible bonds and warrant-bond packages,
virtually nothing is written on the use of share-warrant
packages. Therefore we will derive the motives for share-
warrant packages from the motives for the use of convertible
bonds and warrant-bond packages. The following motives
mentioned in sub-section 2.4 are also relevant for share-
warrant packages:
a) a reduction in flotation costs;
b) the case of overvalued stock;
c) the case of overvalued warrants.
These motives will be discussed below.
ad. a) A reduction in flotation costs.
Just as in case of an issue of warrant-bond packages, see
sub-section 2.4.5, a firm can save on flotation costs by
issuing warrants and shares together. This saving occurs
because in case a firm makes two issues of equity, flotation
costs will have to be paid twice. An issue of share-warrant
packages allows a firm to incur flotation costs only once and
still reach the same objective. Necessary condition is of
course that the price of common stock rises to the point
where warrant exercise takes place.
ad. b) The case of overvalued stock.
In sub-section 2.4.9 it has already been argued that in case
the stock is overvalued, the warrant will be overvalued by a
greater percentage than the stock itself. Therefore an issue
of share-warrant packages is particularly interesting in case
the firm's stock is overvalued. In such a case shares and
especially warrants can be sold for an attractive price.
It should be noticed that in case the stock is undervalued,
an issue of share-warrant packages is not sensible. In the
latter case the stock is undervalued, and the warrant is even
more undervalued. If in such a situation the firm needs to
attract equity, this can better be done by a plain issue of
shares.61
c) The case of overvalued warrants .
In sub-section 2.4.10 it was noticed that Dutch warrants seem
to be overvalued in relation to long term call-options and
foreign warrants. Of course this overvaluation makes it also
attractive to issue share-warrant packages.
Finally we notice that accounting and fiscal factors which
favoured issues of warrant-bond packages and convertible
bonds, neither offer an advantage, nor a disadvantage for a
company that issues share-warrant packages. Both for
accounting and fiscal purposes, the proceeds from the share-
warrant issue are, after deduction of the par value of the
shares, added to the "additional paid-in-capital". This
correctly reflects the economic substance of the transaction
because the price implicitly paid for the warrants has become
unconditional capital, which does not have to be paid back.
In the next section motives for the use of separate issues of
warrants will be discussed.
6. Motives for the use of separate issues of warrants.
6.1. Introduction.
In the introduction we have already argued that besides
issues of warrants in combination with bonds or shares of
common stock, also independent issues of warrants occur.
Because the motives for these issues are virtually the same,
they will all be discussed in this section. Exceptions are
made for motives for the use of warrants in an anti-takeover
amendment and the use of warrants as a form of employee
compensation. Because these last two forms of warrant-issue
involve more complex motives, they will be discussed later in
two separate sections.
In this section the nature and motives for the following
separate issues of warrants will be discussed:
a) an issue of warrants for cash;62
b) an issue of warrants as a(partial) payment for a merger
or take-over;
c) an issue of warrants as a reward for investment banker's
services.
d) an issue of warrants in a reorganization;
e) an issue of warrants as a dividend payment;
6.2. An issue of warrants for cash.
In section 1 we have seen that from 1976 to 1990, 6 Dutch
companies made issues of warrants for cash on the Dutch
capital market. Four of these issues can be characterized as
issues of "Deep-In-the-Money„ (DIM-)warrants. These are the
issues of warrants for cash by Akzo in 1986, VNU and Atag
Holding in 1987 and Furness in 1989. Zn an issue of DIM-
warrants, the company issues a warrant with an exercise price
that is deep below the stock price at the issuance date. At
the time of the issue, the company receives a specific amount
in cash while, based on the fact that the exercise price is
deep below the stock price, the company can be sure that the
warrant will eventually be exercised. Therefore the firm is
relatively sure of a future issue of common stock67.
Motives for the use of warrants for cash can be derived from
the motives for the use of share-warrant packages. It is
advantageous to use warrants for cash if the underlying stock
is overvalued, because in this case warrants are even more
overvalued. It is also advantageous to use warrants in case a
general overvaluation of warrants occurs as described in sub-
section 2.4.10. Because the accountinq and fiscal treatment
of an issue of warrants for cash is the same as the
accounting treatment of share-warrant packages, no accounting
and fiscal benefits exist for the use of issues of warrants
for cash.
6 3 An issue of warrants as a(Aartial) pavment for a meraer
or take-over.63
Sometimes warrants are used as a partial payment for a merger
or take-over. In their take-over bids on "VCI Ventures" and
"Datex Holding" respectively, "European Development
Corporation" and "Getronics" used warrants as a means to
partially pay for the take-over price. In this way the firm
that makes the take-over bid does not have to pay for the
full price in cash, bonds or shares, but it can pay part of
it in warrants. This strategy may contribute to motivate the
target's shareholders to accept the bid: they keep a chance
to the future capital gains of "their" stock.
Motives for the use of warrants as a(partial) payment for a
merger or take-over are the same as motives for the use of
warrants for cash.
6.4. An issue of warrants as a reward for investment banker's
services.
Some authors68 mention the use of warrants in the founding of
a company as a form of compensation to underwriters and
venture capitalists. In such a case the underwriter or
venture capitalist is (partly) paid in, generally non-
tradeable, warrants instead of cash. As far as we know this
form of compensation is only seldom used in the Netherlands.
Motives for the use of warrants as a reward for investment
banker's services are the same as motives for the use of
warrants for cash.
6.5. An issue of warrants in a reorganization.
Cremers and Gans (1977) and Cremers (1979, pages 142-143)
mention the use of warrants in corporate reorganizations. In
such a case a company, that is no longer liquid or solvent,
proposes creditors and~or shareholders to give up specific
rights and accept warrants instead. According to Cremers
(1979, pages 142-143) this use of warrants especially occurs
in the United States.
Motives for the use of warrants in a reorganization are the64
same as motives for the use of warrants for cash.
6.6. An issue of warrants as a dividend yayment.
Sometimes warrants are granted to the firms shareholders as a
means of dividend payment. In the Netherlands issues of
warrants as dividend payments were made by "Rolinco" (1976),
"Bever Beleggingen" (1985) and "Assurantieconcern Stad
Rotterdam" (1990). The last two companies granted warrants in
the context of their jubilees. In all three cases the
warrants were granted as an "extra dividend" on top of the
"normal dividend" granted by the respective companies.
Warrants may also be granted to stockholders instead of cash
and stock dividends. According to Schwartz (1970) eight US
companies issued warrants as an alternative dividend payment
in 1969. From an inquiry among these companies, Schwartz
(1970) concludes that an important reason for the use of
warrants as dividends was the possibility to save cash.
Schwartz (1970) argues that such an issue makes some sense in
a tight money year as 1969, but he argues that, as far as the
cash component is concerned, the same goal could be achieved
by a stock-dividend or no dividend payment at all.
6.7. Conclusion.
In this section we have discussed several separate issues of
warrants. For all of these warrants the exercise period is
determined before or at the day of issue. In the next section
we will discuss a warrant-form that only becomes exercisable
under specific conditions, i.e. in case the firm is
threatened with a hostile take-over.
7 Motives for the use of warrants in an anti-takeover
amendment.
According to Malatesta and Walking (1988) since 1984 warrants
are also being used in anti-takeover amendments. In that year65
the American company "Crown Zellerbach" introduced the so-
called "flip-over-plan"69. In such a plan the company
distributes unexercisable warrants to its shareholders, which
have an exercise price that is much above the then prevailing
stock price. The warrants only become exercisable after a
"triggering event" occurs. Such a triggering event may e.q.
be that an acquiring party obtains, or bids for, a
substantial block of the firm's common stock. In case an
acquiring firm merges with the target firm, the warrants
"flip over". This means that the holders are entitled to
purchase shares in the surviving firm at a substantial
discount from the market price. Assume for example that the
discount is 50~, in that case after the merger is
consummated, the holder is entitled to purchase shares of
common stock of the surviving firm at a price of 50~ of the
then prevailing stock price. This makes a merger very costly.
However, Malatesta and Walking (1988) mention the fact that
the acquiring firm can still buy enough shares to go into
merger and transfer the assets from the target firm to the
acquiring firm. This possibility can be avoided if a"self-
dealing flip-in clause" is included. This clause protects the
firm against a transfer on unfavorable terms, because in
such a case warrant holders other than the large stockholder
are allowed to purchase stock at a substantial discount.
Malatesta and Walking (1988) argue that in both cases
described above, the acquiring firm can simply wait for the
expiration of the warrants before merging the firm. The
latter possibility can be avoided if the firm introduces a
so-called "ownership flip-in clause". In this provision the
warrants of the acquiring firm become void in case the
company accumulates target stock in excess of a specific
amount, which is according to Ryngaert (1988) generally 25g
to 50~ of the firms common stock. The other warrant holders
can buy target stock at the earlier mentioned discount.
In a research Malatesta and Walking (1988) conclude that from
July 1984 to March 1986, 116 US firms announced the adoption
of "flip-over plans". From these 116 "flip-over plans", 11166
contained the "self-dealing flip-in clause" and 46 firms also
contained the "ownership flip-in clause". According to
Malatesta and Walking (1988) 62 firms announced their plans
in the "Wall Street Journal" or the nNew York Times". For
these 62 firms Malatesta and Walking (1988) calculated
average abnormal returns on the announcement dates. These
calculations are made on the same way as described in sub-
section 4.3.4. On average an abnormal return of -1.16~
resulted70. From this negative return Malatesta and Walking
(1988) conclude that the use of "flip-over plans" reduces
shareholder wealth. We notice that, as far as we know, these
plans have until now not been used in The Netherlands.
Contrary to the use of warrants in an anti-takeover
amendment, Dutch companies often use warrants as a form of
employee compensation. This will be discussed in the next
section.
8 Motives for the use of warrants as a form of employee
compensation.
8.1. Introduction.
Many companies use some kind of equity compensation because
of the expected positive influence on employee moral. This
positive influence is believed to result in greater revenues
stability and thus higher profits. The most important form of
equity compensation is the immediate distribution of shares
amongst the companies employees. Another form of equity
compensation is the granting of stock options to the
employees.
Smith and Zimmerman (1976) define an employee stock option7l
as a form of employee compensation granting the employee the
right to purchase a specified number of shares of the firm's
stock aa long av thn c~mployoe remaine with the company. The
condition that the option right expires as soon as the
employee leaves the company is not always included in the67
terms of Dutch employee stoCk options. The option is
generally written on new shares which are to be issued when
the employee exercises his~her right. In this case the term
employee stock warrant would better be at place. It is also
possible that the option is written on existing shares. In
that case the company has to buy in its own shares before the
options are exercised72 73.
As an example of a Dutch stock warrant plan we mention the
issuance of employee stock warrants by the Dutch company
"Nutricia". This company has distributed warrants amongst her
employees which give the right to purchase shares of
"Nutricia Verenigde Bedrijven" at the exercise price of f
158. This was also the market price of the stock at the date
of grant. The warrants granted in may 1988 expire five years
later.
Because motives for the use of employee stock options and
employee stock warrants are virtually the same, in this
section the term employee stock option will both refer to
employee stock options and employee stock warrants. The
following market imperfections that favour the use of stock-
options as a form of employee compensation will be discussed.
In section 8.2 agency costs will be studied followed by
section 8.3 where we will see that employee stock option
plans enjoy an important fiscal advantage. Finally in section
8.4 we will see that also accounting benefits are attached to
the use of employee stock options.
8.2. A reduction of aqencY costs.
In sub-section 2.4.3 the theory of Haugen and Senbet (1981)
is discussed. Departing from the case where an owner-manager
of a firm raises capital, they demonstrate that the problem
of perquisite consumption can be reduced by including an
external call-option for the manager. However, because this
would increase the risk-incentive problem, Haugen and Senbet
(1981) argue that outside investors should be granted an
external put-option. According to Haugen and Senbet (1981)68
the use of external call-options and put-options is analogous
to the use of employee stock options and convertible bonds.
We notice that, as far as we know, no empirical test has been
carried out to investigate whether companies, controlled by
an owner-manager, have simultaneously used convertible bonds
(or warrant-bond packages) and employee stock-options in
order to reduce agency costs.
Besides the above discussed study of Haugen and Senbet
(1981), practically all authors discuss the effect of
employee stock option plans together with the effects of
other equity-based compensation, such as the distribution of
shares to managers. We notice that this discussion only
marginally relates to the problem definition of this paper,
therefore we restrict ourselves to mentioning the outcomes of
the most recent studies on this subject. From a review of
the theoretical literature on incentive effects of equity-
based compensation, Bhagat, Brickley and Lease (1985)
conclude that management which receives some kind of equity-
based compensation is most likely to act in shareholders
interests. Using the same methodology as discussed in sub-
section 4.3.4, Bhagat, Brickley and Lease (1985) study the
abnormal returns on common stocks of companies that announce
the introduction of tax-neutral based equity based
compensation. From this study they conclude that on average
these announcements lead to positive abnormal returns. They
also conclude that especially plans restricted to the upper
management lead to positive returns.
Another type of study is carried out by Agrawal and
Mandelker (1987). They study investment decisions by firms
which include different amounts of equity based compensation.
From this study they conclude that managers of companies that
are largely equity-based compensated act in the best interest
of shareholders.
8.3. Fiscal benefits.69
Until July 1987 Dutch tax law did not have a rule for the
valuation of employee stock options. Since then the value of
an option is, under certain conditions, fixed at 7~~ of the
value of the underlying shares. In this section we will
explain that this kind of valuation is very beneficial for
the employee that receives such an option. We will compare
the results of the fiscal valuation with the results derived
from the application of option pricing models.
8.3.1. The 7~ percentage rule.
Dutch tax law considers all the benefits that an employee
derives from his job as "wages". Wages that are not paid in
cash are considered as wages for their market value. If an
employee receives a listed option (e.g. an option listed on
the European Options Exchange in Amsterdam) this option will
be taxed for its market value.
With regard to unlisted options and warrants the Dutch
Parliament decided that from July 3, 1987, under the
following conditions 7~~ of the value of the underlying
shares will be considered as ordinary income for the
employee74:
1) the employee must be working for the company that grants
the option;
2) the time from the date the option is granted until the
expiration date (the maturity) is not longer than five
years;
3) the exercise price of the option is:
a) under an unconditional option right equal to the market
price of the stock at the date of grant;
b) under a conditional option right equal to the market
price of the stock at the day the condition is fulfilled.
In the case of unconditional option rights taxes have to be
paid on the day the options are granted. In the case of
conditional option rights taxes will have to be paid on the
day the restri~ting condition is fulfilled.
If the above mentioned conditions are not fulfilled the70
employee has to pay taxes over the market value of the
options. This value will have to be determined by the
assessor. The 7s~ rule will be applied both for tradeable
and non-tradeable options.
In his letter to the Dutch parliament the Dutch Parliamentary
Undersecretary of Finance has written that the percentage of
7~ is low because none of the long term options (3-5 years)
listed at the European Options Exchange in Amsterdam had a
value which was below 73g of the value of the underlying
shares.
8 3 2 A comoarison of fiscal- and model values.
In section 2.1 we have seen that the value of an option
depends on the following factors: the stock price, the
exercise price, the standard deviation of the stock's return,
the risk-free interest rate, the maturity and the dividend
yield. Dutch taxation only takes into account two of the
factors that determine option prices, i.e. the stock price
and the exercise price.
After comparing the outcomes of the original B~S-model with
the outcomes of the fiscal rule Rijkers (1987) concludes that
the fiscal rule gives relatively low outcomes.
Important disadvantage of the original B~S-model is that it
does not take dividend payments into account. Therefore we
will use a special version of the B~S-model, presented by
Merton (1973). In this model, from now on to be referred to
as the Merton model, dividend payments on the stock are
assumed to be paid continuously, so that the dividend yield
(g) is constant:
C - Se-9(T-t)N(dl') - Xe-rf(T-t)N(d2~)
where:
g - the dividend yield;
dl' - ln(S~X~t(rf-qfoZ~2) (T-t1
a,~ ( T-t )
d2' - dl' - Q,~(T-t).
(7)71
The outcomes of the Merton model will be compared with the
values calculated using the 7;-percentage rule. In order to
make such a comparison we have selected the data for the
companies of which options are traded on the European Options
Exchange in Amsterdam.
Data are selected for January 2, 1991. The exercise price of
the options (X) has been put on the same level as the market
price of the stock (S) in order to fulfil the fiscal
condition. The riskless interest rate (rf) is estimated as
the daily average yield on government bonds with a maturity
of 3 to 5 years (9.24~). Option values are calculated
assuming a maturity 5 years. The dividend yield (g) is
estimated as the ratio of the dividend paid in the period
from January 1, 1990 to December 31, 199075 and the average
stock price realized in that period76 77. The standard
deviation (a) is estimated as the implied standard deviation
(ISD) of call-options outstanding on January 2, 1991. The ISD
is the standard deviation that results if the model price of
an option is equated to its market price. However, on January
2, 1991 most companies had several series of call-options
outstanding with different maturities and exercise prices.
Following Beckers (1981) we have selected the ISD with the
highest value for the derivative from the option price to the
standard deviation. In case the option price was lower than
50 cents, no ISD was calculated, as the bid-ask spread will
typically be large relative to the price of the call-
option78.
The data and the outcomes for the Merton model and the fiscal
valuation are presented in table 10 79.
Table 10: The data, Merton-values and fiscal values for
employee stock options of 24 Dutch companies assumina a
maturity of 5 years and an interest-rate of 9.24~
Company S-X g a Merton- fiscal (6)~
value value (5)
~100~
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Aegon f 106.00 0.051 0.237 f 24.40 f 7.95 32.6~
Ahold f 65.70 0.015 0.201 f 21.99 f 4.93 22.4~72
Akzo f 74.00 0.075
Amev f 46.20 0.049
Buhrm. T. f 44.90 0.046
DAF f 18.00 0.088
DSM f 85.10 0.088
Elsevier f 74.30 0.022
Gist B. f 27.90 0.044
Heineken f 135.70 0.029
Hoogovens f 51.20 0.086
Int Mullerf 68.50 0.043
KLM f 19.50 0.058
KNP f 36.70 0.058
Kon. Olie f 132.30 0.055
Nat. Ned. f 48.30 0.048
Nedlloyd f 36.10 0.048
Pakhoed f 197.00 0.036
Philips f 20.00 0.045
Polygram f 29.20 0
Stork f 40.00 0.025
Unilever f 151.90 0.032
VOC f 42.80 0.048
Wessanen f 62.40 0.038
0.398 f 18.95 f 5.55 29.3~
0.249 f 11.21 f 3.47 31.0~
0.233 f 10.90 f 3.37 30.9~
0.451 f 4.55 f 1.35 29.7~
0.347 f 16.97 f 6.38 37.6~
0.245 f 24.50 f 5.57 22.7~
0.336 f 8.55 f 2.09 24.4~
0.147 f 34.86 f 10.18 29.2~
0.340 f 10.24 f 3.84 37.5~
0.335 f 21.17 f 5.14 24.3~
0.575 f 7.65 f 1.46 19.1~
0.244 f 7.87 f 2.75 34.9~
0.150 f 22.67 f 9.92 43.8g
0.278 f 12.65 f 3.62 28.6~
0.545 f 14.71 f 2.71 18.4á
0.247 f 55.56 f 14.78 26.6~
0.418 f 6.98 f 1.50 21.5~
0.427 f 15.06 f 2.19 14.5~
0.302 f 13.99 f 3.00 21.4~
0.138 f 36.76 f 11.39 31.0~
0.416 f 14.50 f 3.21 22.1~
0.261 f 17.67 f 4.68 26.5~
From this table we conclude that all options had a fiscal
value which was lower than the value according to the Merton
model. Another conclusion that we can draw from table 10 is
that large differences exist between the options of
different firms. If a Polygram employee receives an option
with a value of f 15.06, he only has to pay taxes over f
2.19. This means that only 14.5~ of the option's value is73
considered as ordinary income. Employees of Koninklijke Olie
are less friendly taxed, they have to pay taxes over 43.8~
of the option's value.
We can conclude that this kind of taxation is especially
advantageous for employees who receive long term options
written on stock with a low dividend yield and a high
standard deviation.
8.3.3. The exemntion of employee stock options from Dutch
income tax.
According to Dutch tax law employee stock options are
exempted from income tax for an amount of f 750 per employee
per year. This exemption is granted under the followinq
conditions:
1) the employee must be working for the company that grants
the option;
2) the options cannot be traded; this restriction does not
apply to the acquired shares;
3) the exercise price of the option is:
a) under an unconditional option right equal to the market
price of the stock at the date of grant;
b) under a conditional option right equal to the market price
of the stock at the day the condition is fulfilled;
4) at least 75g of the employees which are permanent
appointed have to be able to take part in the stock option
plan.
If the maturity is not longer than five years, the 7~~-
valuation rule can also be applied. This means that the value
of the underlying shares, on which tax-free options can be
granted, is f 10,000.
We recall the example of Polygram. To each employee of
Polygram options can be granted on 342 shares (f 10,000~f
29.2 - 342). The value of these options using the Merton
model is then: 342 ~ f 15.06 - f 5150. This is much more than
the formal fiscal exemption of f 750.
Notice that the fiscal condition of non-tradeability can74
easily be evaded if the employee holds the option, which has
been rewarded to him by his employer, and at the same time
writes an identical option to an option trader.
We complete this section by arguing that the exemption of
employee stock options for Dutch income taxes will especially
be profitable for employees of risky80 companies, with a low
dividend yield, this is due to the fact that Dutch tax law
uses a rough valuation method for employee stock options.
8.4. Accountinq benefits.
Based on the fiscal treatment of employee stock options it
can be expected that companies will usually set the exercise
price of employee stock options equal to the stock price
prevailing at the date of grant. In these cases companies
make no specific entry in their accounts of the granting of
employee stock-options. This implies that notwithstanding the
fact that the company grants a compensation to its employee,
which leads to (opportunity) costs, neither a cost is
recognized, nor an outstanding claim. Therefore the granting
of employee stock-options leads to a favourable accounting
treatment81.
With regard to the reporting of outstanding employee stock
options the same rules as described for warrants apply (see
sub-section 2.4.6). In a research with respect to the annual
reports of Dutch companies for the years 1982 to 1985,
Eijgenhuijsen, Oudejans and Rietkerk (1987) conclude that a
great variety exists both with regard to the place in the
annual report where the information is presented as with
regard to the amount of information presented. These results
are in accordance with the results found by Duffhues and Veld
(1991) with regard to warrants (see sub-section 2.4.6).
8.5. Conclusion.
In this section we have seen that several market
imperfections favour the use of warrants as a form of75
employee compensation. These imperfections are the reduction
of agency costs, accounting benefits and especially the
favourable tax treatment of employee stock-options by Dutch
tax law.
9. Summary and conclusions.
In this paper motives for the use of warrants are discussed.
In finance literature, motives for the use of warrant-bond
loans are generally derived from motives for the use of
convertible bond loans, which are a close alternative to
warrant-bond loans. Therefore the discussion was started with
the motives for the use of convertible bonds, that are also
applicable to warrant-bond packages. We have seen that
convertible bonds are neither a cheap form of capital, nor a
deferred sale of stock at an attractive price. In a world of
perfect, efficient and complete capital markets, an issue of
convertible bonds only leads to a non-value creating trade-
off between risk and return. In a world of capital markets
that are not (entirely) perfect, efficient and complete,
motives for the use of convertible bonds and warrant-bond
packages are based on market imperfections, market
inefficiencies and market incompleteness. A number of these
motives is discussed in this paper.
Also the choice between convertible bonds and warrant-bond
packages on one side and puttable common stock arrangements
on the other side is discussed. Although the pay-off of a
puttable common stock arrangement is the same as the pay-off
of convertible bonds and warrant-bond packages, both market
imperfections in favour of puttable common stock on one side
and market imperfections in favour of convertible bonds and
warrant-bond packages on the other side can be identified.
Because of the separate tradeability of warrants and bonds,
a flexibility advantage exists for the holder as well as the
issuer of warrant-bond packages. These advantages do not
exist for convertible bonds. Besides that, several market
imperfections favour an issue of warrant-bond packages over76
an issue of convertible bonds. On the other hand also market
imperfections can be identified that favour an issue of
convertible bonds over an issue of warrant-bond packages.
Motives for the use of share-warrant packages and separate
issues of warrants for miscellaneous reasons can be derived
from motives for the use of warrant-bond packages.
We end this paper by indicating some interesting topics for
future research:
- In this paper a number of institutional factors (such as
accounting- and fiscal aspects) have only been studied for
the Netherlands. It would be interesting to make a similar
research for other countries, such as e.g. the United
States, Japan and the United Kingdom.
- An important question is of course whether our list of
motives is complete.
- The last topíc for future research we mention, is an
investigation of the motives that firms have in practice to
issue warrant-bond packages. Are firms still driven by the
irrational (traditional) motives? Or, are they aware of the
irrationality of these motives and are their decisions
based on the rational (modern) motives.
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Appendix A: Warrants issued in the Netherlands by Dutch
companies from January 1, 1976 to December 31. 1990.
A1 Dutch warrants issued in combination with bonds.
1976 - Nationale Nederlanden
1977 - Naarden Internationaal (warrants A and B)
- Westland Utrecht Hypotheekbank (warrants A and B)
1983 - Ahold
- Bredero Vastgoed
- KLM (warrants A and B)
- Philips
- VNU
1984 - Bredero Vastgoed
- Philips






- Staal Bankiers (warrants A and B)
1987 - Meneba (warrants A and B)
- van Ommeren (warrants A and B)
- Stork
1989 - Koninklijke Nederlandse Papierfabrieken (KNP)82
A2 Du ch warrants issued in combination with common stock.




1984 - Compudata (Parallel Market), later (1985) under the
name Tulip Computers (Official Market)
1985 - Asia Pacific Growth Fund (listed in US dollars)
- Hunter pouglas
- MK International Ventures
1986 - Amro
A3 Dutch warrants issued in combination with preferred common
stock.
1985 - Canada Overseas Investment Corporation (Parallel
Market, listed in Canadian dollars).
A4 Dutch warrants issued for cash.
1986 - Akzo
- Investeringsmaatschappij Nederland Holding (Parallel
Market)
1987 - Atag Holding
- VNU
1988 - Holland Sea Search Holding
1989 - Furness
A5 Dutch warrants issued as a payment for a merQer.
1987 - European Development Corporation (Parallel Market,
listed in US dollars)
1988 - Getronics
A6 Dutch warrants issued as a dividend payment.
1976 - Rolinco
1985 - Bever Beleggingen (listed in US dollars)
1990 - Assurantieconcern Stad Rotterdam
Apnendix B- Convertible bonds issued in the Netherlands bv
Dutch companies from January 1 1976 to December 31, 1990.
1976 - Biihrman-Tetterode 7 1~4~
- Schuitema 8 3~4~
- Stevin 8 3~4~
- Stork 9g
1977 - Wereldhave 7~
1978 - Volker Stevin 8 1~2~
1980 - Bredero Vastgoed 11~
- Elsevier 8 3~4~
1983 - Océ van de Grinten 6 1~2~
1984 - Amsterdam-Rubber 8~
1985 - ABN 5~83
- Automobiel-Industrie "Rotterdam" 8 1~4~
- Brink-Molynbeheer 6 3~4~
- Hoogovens 6~
- Koninklijke Nederlandse Papierfabrieken (KNP) 7~
- Nijverdal 6 1~2~
- Proost en Brand 7~
- Verto 6 1~2~
1986 - Bobel 6 1~2~
- Center Pares 3 3~4~
- Chamotte-Unie 6 1~4~
- Enraf Nonius 5 1~2~
- Holec 8 1~2~
- ICA Holding 6~
- Industrieele Maatschappij 5 3~8~
- Investeringsmaatschappij Nederland Holding 7~
(Parallel Market)
- Pie Medical 5~ (Parallel Market)
- Samas Groep 5 1~2~
- Wolters Samson-Groep 2 1~2~
1987 - vd Hoop en Co. 5~
1988 - ACF-Holding 6 1~4g
- Hagemeyer 6 1~4~
- Holland Sea Search Holding 8~
- Medicopharma 6~
- NKF-Holding 6 1~4g
- VRG-Groep 4 1~2~
1989 - Fokker 4 3~4~
- Hagemeyer 4 3~4~
- Nutricia 4 3~4~
- west Invest 7 1~2~
Notes-
1. Part of this paper is derived from material earlier
published. This is the case for parts of:
- sections 2.2 and 2.3, see Veld and Grazell (1991);
- sub-section 2.4.3, see Grazell and Veld (1991);
- section 2.4.6, see Veld and Duffhues (1990) and Duffhues
and Veld (1991);
- section 4.2, and sub-sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1, see Veld
(1989b);
- section 8.3, see Veld (1989a).
2. In this paper the terms "firm" and "company" are used as
synonym.
3. In fact this is the definition of an equity call-warrant.
The term "call" reflects the right to buy. Also equity ,put-
warrants exist, which give the right to sell back the
underlying stock to the company. Duffhues (1990) discusses
other warrant types, that give the right to buy other
underlying values than shares of common stock, such as bonds.84
4. Only warrants are included which have been listed on the
Official Market or the Parallel Market of the Amsterdam Stock
Exchange (ASE) and which give the right to buy shares listed
on the Official Market or the Parallel Market of the ASE.
5. Different is meant in the sense that these warrants
differ with regard to the exercise price and~or the initial maturity.
6. The Parallel Market is a market that operates since
February 1982 with the aim to enable small and medium
companies to trade publicly. Since July 1990 it is called the
Official Parallel Market ("Officiële Parallelmarkt").
7. In this paper equity warrants, with a maturity shorter
than 30 days, that are used as a dividend payment are
defined as preemptive rights. These are not included in table
1.
8. We abstract from the following "academic cases":
- the bond and the warrant (conversion right) are
detachable, but the warrant can only be exercised by
redeeming the accompanying bond;
- the bond and the warrant (conversion right) are non-
detachable, but the warrant can be exercised for cash.
9. In case the holder of the convertible bond has the
possibility to convert before the redemption date a
complication occurs, because in case of conversion the
accompanying bond is redeemed. Before the expiration date the
market value of this bond depends on the term structure of
interest rates. Therefore the conversion right is in fact a
warrant with a changing exercise price (see Veld (1991a,
pages 57-59). Our assumption serves to abstract from this
complication. Although we are aware of the fact that this is
a heroic assumption in practice, we notice that abstracting
from this complication is not essential in the context of
this paper.
10. See e.g. Brigham (1966).
11. The amount of the opportunity loss is f 125 -~- f 75 - f
50. The amount of the opportunity loss can a priori be
reduced if the company includes the right to call the bonds
before their maturity. Of course this also leads to a lower
(implicit) price for the conversion rights.
12. This objection can be overcome by issuing "mandatory
convertible bonds". Mandatory convertible bonds are bonds
with contracts that obligate bond purchasers to buy
sufficient common stock from the issuer at the conversion
price to retire the issue in full by its scheduled maturity date.
13. For reasons of simplicity Copeland and Weston (1988)
abstract from taxes and flotation costs. In addition we
remark that the B~S-model is only appropriate if the85
assumption is made that the underlying stock does not pay any
dividends. We notice that in case dividends are paid, an
integration of the CAPM and the Merton (1973) model may be
preferred, see Veld and Grazell (1991).
14. The relatively high risk of company H is expressed both
in a higher total risk (a) and a higher systematic risk (ps).
15. We abstract from the dilution effect that occurs if the
warrants are exercised. This is justified by the
demonstration of Schulz and Trautmann (1989) that the
outcomes from a dilution-corrected version of the B~S-model
only marginally differ from the outcomes of the original B~S-
model.
16. The face value of the bonds, is equal to the issue- and
the redemption price.
17. The conversion ratio is the quotient of the redemption
price (f 1000) and the exercise price (f 75).
18. Parts of shares, i.e. 0.333 share are assumed to be paid
in cash on basis of the prevailing stock price at the
conversion date.
19. It is important to notice that even if we assume that the
beta of the company's stock is stationary (this on itself is
a heroic assumption, see e.g. Van der Hilst (1989, pages 74-
84)), the beta of the warrant is not stationary. This is due
to the fact that a change in time, causes a change in the
factor N(dl), which causes a change in the beta of the
option, and therefore in the beta of the warrant. Because of
the fact that beta is not stationary, the required return on
the warrant also changes over time.
20. Jarrow and Rudd (1983, page 107) show that in case
certain option pricing models are used, a warrant's beta may
be lower than the beta of the underlying common stock. This
is the case if the call-option price is not convex in each
stock price. Jarrow and Rudd (1983, page 107) argue that a
sufficient condition for the call price to be convex in the
stock price is that the ,stock return distribution is
independent of the stock price. This is one of the
assumptions underlying the B~S-model.
21. In this context risk refers to systematic risk (Q).
22. See also Emanuel (1983).
23. Although, according to Duffhues (1988), capital markets
are probably more perfect, efficient and complete than they
were a few decades ago.
24. These characteristics are to a large extent based on Fama
and Miller (1972).86
25. Tempelaar and Overmeer (1987) remark that although
finance literature agrees over the definition of efficient
markets, only little consensus is reached over the conditions
that must be fulfilled on markets to be "price efficient".
See Tempelaar and Overmeer (1987) for an elaborate discussion
on this matter. In this paper we confine ourselves to
remarking that efficient markets are markets in which
securities are priced correctly.
26. Relative is meant in the sense that convertibles are less
sensitive to the risk of the issuing company than e.g.
ordinary bonds.
27. About the cost of equity, A Brassard (1989) writes:
"This is obviously governed by a multitude of factors
including project growth, gearing considerations and the
stance of creditors".
28. The question whether a warrant can be considered as a
financial innovation will not be discussed in this paper.
29. See in particular Jensen and Meckling ( 1976), Haugen and
Senbet ( 1981), Green ( 1984), Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1985)
and Brennan and Schwartz ( 1986). Also modern textbooks in
finance support this motive, see e.g. Weston and Copeland
(1986, pages 851-855) and Brealey and Myers ( 1988, page 534).
30. A similar argument is presented by Smith (1986, page 10).
31. Jensen and Meckling ( 1976, page 312) mention e.g. a
larger than optimal computer to play with and purchase of
production inputs from friends.
32. This problem is sometimes referred to as the "bondholder
wealth expropriation hypothesis".
33. With regard to conversion rights Jensen and Meckling
(1976, page 354) notice:
"Furthermore, the addition of a conversion privilege to fixed
claims such as debt or preferred stock would also tend to
reduce the incentive effects of the existence of such fixed
claims and ther~fore lower the agency costs associated with them".
. ,o ~ ~,i.
34. This can best be explained by the put-call parity: the
combination of a(European) call-option and a zero-coupon
bond has the same pay-off as the combination of a(European)
put-option and a share of common stock ( provided that the
exercise price of the call-option equals both the exercise
price of the put-option and the nominal value of the zero-
coupon bond). For an explanation of the put-call parity see
e.g. Jarrow and Rudd (1983, pages 47-59).
35. Notes on the original work of Haugen and Senbet (1981)
and Barnea, Haugen and Senbet ( 1985) have been made by Kudla
(1984), Farmer and Winter ( 1986) and Narayanan (1987).87
Responses on these comments have been given by Haugen and
Senbet (1986, 1987). We notice that in his comment on Jensen
and Meckling (1976), Green (1984) also places a few notes on
the Haugen and Senbet (1981) approach.
36. The required return on the warrant is paid in the sense
that the warrant-holder, exercises his warrant and receives
the difference between the market value of the stock and the
exercise price.
37. Veld and Duffhues (1990) also present the ideal "Market
Value Method", in which all securities are recorded on the
balance-sheet for their true (market) value. They notice
however that the use of this method is not permitted in the
Netherlands. Because of its more theoretical than practical
use, we will not discuss the "Market Value Method" in this paper.
38. Veld and Duffhues (1990) argue that in practice also a
"discount method" exists in which an asset is raised to
represent the discount and where debt is recorded for its
principle amount. Also a variant exists of the "discount
method" with regard to the calculation of the discount which
differs from the variant presented in table 5. However, Veld
and Duffhues (1990) argue that the method presented in table
5 is theoretically most justified. Therefore we will not
discuss the other variants.
39. The amortization of the discount in year 2 becomes 16~ of
f 867.07 - f 138.73 minus f 112.50 - f 26.23.
40. An interesting difference could be noticed with regard to
the amortization of the discount over the years. Only NMB
used the "amortization-scheme" presented in table 5. The
other 3 companies amortized the discount using a linear
deduction. Following our example, an annual deduction of f
155.54~5 - f 31.11, results in this case.
41. Resolution no. 286-1547, released on February 26, 1986,
published in BNB 1986~113.
42. See e.g. Juch (1985) and Van der Geld (1990). For a
discussion of the tax treatment of mandatory convertible
debt, see Van der Geld (1990).
43. For a more elaborate discussion on this matter we refer
to e.g. Juch (1985), Tempelaar (1986), Van Sonderen (1988),
Snijders (1989) and Van der Geld (1990).
44. According to a press release of the Ministry of Finance,
November 3, 1988, no. 88~296.
45. For a discussion about the effects if the bond is sold
before the redemption date, we refer to Van der Geld (1990).88
46. For reasons of uniformity, Tempelaar's (1986) symbols
have been replaced by the symbols earlier defined in this
paper.
47. W- f 155.54; kb - 0.16; n- 5.
48. Although the warrant-resolution was only released at
February 26, 1986, the Parliamentary Undersecretary of
Finance, already announced his point of view on May 23, 1985.
49. For an explicit calculation we refer to sub-section
2.4.6 (the "discount method").
50. Van der Geld (1990) defines informal capital as the sum
of the advantages that a stockholder grants "his" company in
his position as a stockholder, which advantages can not be
considered as "formal capital". Formal capital is the sum of
common stock and additional paid-in-capital.
For a discussion whether the treatment as informal capital is
justified we refer to Bavinck (1988), Van Sonderen (1988) and
Snijders (1989).
51. The actual release of the warrant resolution took place
in February 1986 (see note 42).
52. This argument has also been brought forward in finance
literature, see e.g. the textbook of Levy and Sarnat (1988,
page 498).
53. This explanation has also more recently been put forward
by e.g. Levy and Sarnat (1988, page 498).
54. Veld (1991a, pages 54-60) discusses the following
problems that (may) occur:
1) the bond and the conversion right are not separately
tradeable;
2) the convertible bond contains a sinking fund provision;
3) the convertible bond can be converted before its
expiration date;
4) the convertible bond, denominated in another currency
than the underlying shares of common stock, is convertible
at a fixed exchange rate;
5) the convertible bond is callable.
55. In this context also "transferable put rights" (TRPs)
should be mentioned. TRPs are distributed to the firms
shareholders in proportion with the number of shares owned.
They give the right to sell back shares of common stock to
the company at a fixed price within a specific period.
Therefore TRPs are in fact symmetrical to pre-emptive rights.
See Kale, Noe and Gay (1989) for a further discussion.
56. Consistent with the definition in section 1, we have only
included the convertible bond loans which were listed on the
Official Market or the Parallel Market of the Amsterdam Stock89
Exchange, and which conversion rights gave the right to buy
shares of common stock of companies that are also traded on
the Official Market or the Parallel Market of the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange. Because only conversion rights are included
that give the riQht to buy shares of common stock, we have
not included the issue of mandatory convertible bonds by HCS
Technology in 1989.
57. Cremers (1979, 1980) expresses this advantage as the
possibility to fix a different maturity of the bond loan and
the warrants. In his explanation, however, he restricts
himself to the possibility of attracting equity while keeping
outstanding debt. Veld (1989b) has shown that this is not the
same. In this paper we will restrict our analysis to the
possibility of attracting equity from warrant exercise while
the accompanying bonds are still outstanding.
58. An additional payment was included in the convertible
bonds issued by VMF Stork (1976), Schuitema (1976) and
Amsterdam-Rubber (1984), while the convertible bond-loans
issued by Hagemeyer (1988) and Holland Sea Search Holding
(1988) both included a repayment.
59. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Long and Sefcik (1990)
present abnormal returns both for the complete sample and for
a smaller sample of convertible bonds or warrant-bond
packages where observations contaminated by the occurrence of
confounding events are eliminated. In table 9 only the
results for the complete samples are included. We notice that
the results for the smaller (uncontaminated) samples do not
importantly differ from the results of the complete samples.
60. This is partly compensated by the fact that the early
redemption clause generally includes a"premium" for early
redemption.
61. Exceptions on this rule were the convertible bond-issues
made by Hagemeyer in 1988 and West-Invest in 1989.
62. In none of these four cases the warrant holders receive a
compensation for the loss of capital gains on the underlying
shares in case they are called.
63. This idea is confirmed in a research under US warrants by
Long and Sefcik (1990). They conclude that from the 36
warrants issued between 1965-1978 only one warrant was
callable, while from the 31 warrants issued between 1979-1984
22 warrants were callable.
64. This 1.8~ may not be compared with the 3.8~ mentioned in
sub-section 2.4.4. The 1.8~ presented by Long and Sefcik
(1990) is only the underwriters spread, while the 3.8~
presented by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) are the total
flotation costs.90
65. Similar results are found by Billingsley, Lamy and Smith
(1990). Because they carry out 2 different tests, they
present characteristics for 2 samples which partly differ.
The average spreads for the warrant-bond packages are
respectively 3.31~ and 3.74~, while the average spreads for
the convertible bonds are respectively 2.05á and 1.99~.
66. Because Van der Geld's (1990) article appeared in May
1990, we assume that recently indicates the period until the
end of 1989.
67. See also Duffhues (1990).
68. See e.g. Duffhues (1990) and Van Horne (1989, page 614).
69. According to Malatesta and Walking (1988) and Ryngaert
(1988) "flip-over plans" are part of the family of so-called
"poison pill securities". Ryngaert (1988, page 377) defines
poison pill securities as:
"a family of contingent securities that impose financial
burdens on acquirers when triggered by change-of-control
events such as a corporate merger".
70. Ryngaert (1988) makes a similar research under a group
of poison pill securities, without making separate
calculations for different types of poison pills. He also
concludes that on average a(small) negative abnormal return
results.
71. In finance literature employee stock options are also
referred to as "executive stock options".
72. Eijgenhuijsen, Oudejans and Rietkerk (1987) mention as an
example of a company using call-options, Royal Dutch
("Koninklijke Olie").
73. According to Haugen and Senbet (1981) in the US some
companies grant their employees stock appreciation rights.
In such a form of employee compensation the employee receives
the difference between the exercise price and the market
price of the stock at the expiration date. The compensation
is granted in cash, stock or a combination of cash and stock.
This form of employee compensation offers the employees an
advantage over stock warrant plans because they do not need
to invest cash in order to exercise their rights. As far as
we know such a plan has not (yet) been used in The Netherlands.
74. Article 18a of the "Uitvoeringsbeschikking Loonbelasting
1972".
75. These dividends include the total value of the cash-
dividends, stock-dividends and preemptive rights granted to
shareholders in 1990.91
76. The average stock price is estimated as the average of
the closing stock prices realized on the first trading day of
each month.
77. Because at the end of 1990 a merger took place between
the Dutch banks ABN and AMRO into ABN-AMRO-holding no
estimation for the dividend yield could be made for this
company. Therefore no calculation for ABN-AMRO-holding is
included.
78. Just as in section 2.2.3 (see note 17) we abstract from
the dilution effect that occurs if we are dealing with
employee stock warrants.
79. We notice that three companies did not have call-options
outstanding with prices of at least 50 cents, this was the
case for CSM, Fokker and NMB-Postbank.
80. Zn this context the total risk ( a) is meant.
81. In the United States a similar accounting practice
exists. Therefore several authors present alternative
accounting methods. Smith and Zimmerman (1976) suggest the
use of lower bound option values, while Weygandt (1977) and
Noreen and Wolfson (1981) suggest the use of option pricing
models to account for employee stock options.1
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